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EDITORIAL

HYMNS AND HYMN-BOOKS, ETC.

THE review which we publish below from Dr. Lowther Clarke's pen draws attention to a subject of perennial interest. Few features in the life and worship of the Church of England are more distinctive than the place which it gives to hymns. Its hymns constitute, indeed, one of the strongest of the links that bind Churchmen together in all parts of the world. Many of them, of course, we share with our Nonconformist brethren; some of the best of them are the work of Nonconformists—witness only the hymns of Charles Wesley or Isaac Watts. Yet there is a variety in the Anglican collections, and a restraint and discrimination in their usage, which are characteristic. Many hymns also we share with Roman Catholics: but we know them far better. Hymnody is more common in Roman Catholic churches on the Continent than is always realized: to hear village congregations in Brittany and Savoy singing hymns at Mass, or a great Parisian church like St. Germain des Prés ringing with the "Hast du denn, Jesu" (*E.H.* 536) at the end of Benediction, is to understand this. Yet it is undoubtedly the case that the love of hymns, and familiarity with a large number of them, is more widely diffused in the English Church than in the Roman. And if it be true, as Plato and others have taught, that the songs people sing and the melodies they use have a vital effect on their spiritual growth, it is obviously of the first importance that both the words and the music of our hymns should be of high quality.

Yet it is an axiom that the perfect hymn-book does not exist. That is, no doubt, a good thing: the lesson of Robert Browning's poem, "Andrea del Sarto," is never old; we need imperfection to stimulate new invention. The part of those who lead opinion in the Church—parish priests, teachers and Sunday School teachers, organists, Church Councillors and others—is to seek the best hymn-book (or hymn-books) available and to exercise a judicious and kindly selection within it. The

first *desideratum*, therefore, in a hymn-book is that it shall be in the fullest sense of the word Catholic—Catholic in the faith and teaching it embodies, in the range of spiritual impulses and experiences it voices, in the variety of occasions for which it provides, in the sympathies it elicits, in the sources from which it draws both words and music; this will mean that it must have the kind of anonymity which belongs to the work of a corporate body. It is a pleasure to know the names of the authors and composers—who has not spent some agreeable minutes, when the hymn displeased him, in browsing among the *indices* at the end? But the book as a whole must represent not an individual mind, but the general mind of the Church, so far as may be.

This does not mean that there is no place for the more individual book, so long as it is recognized for what it is. The place of such a book—of *Songs of Praise*, for instance—is not to supplant other books, but to provide fresh material for the Church's life; material which can be used experimentally for a while, and after testing be gathered into other and more general collections. It is a pity that the real service performed by a book of this type should be obscured by the too ambitious claims advanced on its behalf: for in the long run no hymn-book can make much way on propaganda. We do not doubt, however, that *Songs of Praise* (like Robert Bridges' *Yattendon Hymnal* before it) represents a useful piece of pioneer work, and a valuable contribution to English hymnody.

When we pass to the books of more permanent and universal appeal, the ground is shared by the two outstanding collections, *Hymns Ancient and Modern* and *The English Hymnal*. Both of them are hymn-books for the Church as a whole; they breathe the faith of Christendom, resemble the Psalms (the true prototype of Christian hymns) in expressing every mood and moment of religion, and are culled from the best of every age. Each again has its distinctive excellences. It is no disparagement of the earlier book to say that *The English Hymnal* marked an epoch in the Church's life. Its fine selections from Latin hymns and from the hymns of Puritans like Milton and Bunyan, its original matter such as the Swahili hymn for the Departed or Mr. Athelstan Riley's "Ye watchers and ye holy ones," its introduction of new tunes or of old ones not generally known before—witness Aberystwyth, Ton-y-Botel, Richmond and many others—all these things, presented in a most attractive form, combined to give the book almost at once an established position.

And yet the book has by no means superseded *Hymns Ancient and Modern*; nor is it likely to do so. For one thing, it

does not contain certain hymns which the English Church will assuredly never surrender. "Hail, gladdening light," with its fine tune, amongst Evening hymns; "Christ, who once amongst us" amongst Children's hymns; "The Sower went forth sowing," for Harvest festival; "The Saints of God! Their conflict past," for a funeral—all these are treasures of the older book which few would surrender. The more the book is tested, in fact, the more it lives up to its title: it is a wonderful combination of old and new. At the same time, it has to pay the penalties of its popularity. Bad old tunes, and sometimes bad old words, have to be kept on, because they would be too widely missed, if deleted in a revision; and, most tiresomely, old numbers have to be kept on, with the result that new editions have to be by way of supplement, and their real value is only slowly appreciated. But, take it all round, *Hymns Ancient and Modern* is as indispensable as it ever was; and we conceive that, if the time should come when a radical revision and rearrangement of its contents are possible, it will be welcomed by the Church with the same kind of enthusiasm as greeted the advent of *The English Hymnal*. We do not anticipate, nor desire, that either should oust the other: reasons of copyright alone would probably stand in the way: rather we look forward to a new edition of it which will bring the whole compilation, in words, music, and *format*, more nearly into line with the best criticisms of its friends today.

*Christian Outlines** is the title which Dr. Alington has chosen for what is in effect a most telling exposition of Christianity. Written throughout in the conversational style of which he is a master, its 130 pages touch on all the most important points in Christian faith, worship, and conduct, with a good slice of the history of Christendom thrown in. And they are touched on, not in any butterfly fashion, but rather as nails are hit on the head: the primary meaning of each principle of belief or practice is brought out, and its difficulties faced; while at the same time the coherence of the various parts of Christianity, and its relation to the thought of the world today, shine out on every page. There are places, naturally, where the outline asks to be filled in, and the reader might not always fill it in precisely as the author does: but even in those cases he will find himself provided with new lines of approach, as when Dr. Alington quotes Clovis' question, "Why was I not there with my Franks?" in connection with the Cross and the Atonement. Many a parish priest will find new zest given to his teaching by this book; and many a layman, not least the young, will discover here how strong the claim of his religion is both on his intelligence and on his heart.

* Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1932. 2s 6d. net.

THE ATONEMENT: AN INTERPRETATION

VERY few sermons are heard today dealing with the doctrine of the Atonement. It is presupposed in the devotional addresses of Holy Week, and some clergy prepare for these by laying firm dogmatic foundations earlier in Lent. But they are the minority. The fact is that the old phrases no longer appeal to our congregations, and new ways of presenting the truth of the Atonement are not easy to find.* Yet the Church is irrevocably committed to the dogma. In the Nicene Creed we confess belief, which includes trust, in the Son of God who "for our salvation came down from heaven . . . and was crucified (σταυρωθέντα) for us."† The repetition of "for us" at this point connects salvation with the Cross rather than with the Incarnation generally. The application of the merits of Christ is bound up with life in the Church. So we "acknowledge one baptism (entrance into the community) *for the remission of sins.*" Even more impressive is the *lex orandi*. Our Eucharistic worship centres round Calvary, and every prayer with its ending "through Jesus Christ our Lord" implies the Atonement. Yet the Church has never defined the manner in which Christ saves us. Certain lines of thought are associated with the names of famous teachers and are in themselves true—and helpful up to a point. But left to ourselves we should not naturally formulate our convictions in the same ways as our forefathers. In the present paper an attempt is made to approach the mystery in a modern way. It does not pretend to do more than isolate one or two factors which appeal to the writer. But, provided no slur is cast on the great historical theories, the twentieth century may, as lawfully as its predecessors, discuss the mystery on individual lines.

I

A very brief survey of the past will suffice. The greatest theology of all is St. Paul's, in which all subsequent theories are rooted. Just because it is so rich and deep, unanimity in its interpretation seems to be impossible. And we cannot altogether silence the question whether the apostle did not base

* Probably few of the laity realize that in the Revised Version, with the adoption of the reading λύσαντι in Rev. i. 5, the phrase "washed in the blood" disappears from the New Testament.

† The participle shows that the crucifixion is an integral part of that in which we express belief. I believe "in the Son of God who was crucified" is the meaning, not "in the Son of God, who was crucified."

a theology of the Atonement on a personal experience which, being unique, cannot be made normative.

The Epistle to the Hebrews gives us the most common interpretation of the Cross, in the light of the Old Testament sacrifices. We inherit this language, which is the common stock of our hymns, and for devotional purposes none of us presumably would wish anything better. But can we *preach* the theology of the Epistle today? The ancient world, in which sacrifices were a universal background, of Jewish and Gentile life alike, has receded into the dim distance. Before "Hebrews" can become real to our hearers, an antiquarian reconstruction of its presuppositions is necessary. Besides, the critical study of the Old Testament has altered our view of sacrifice. The Levitical ordinances are no longer looked on as the direct commands of God Almighty, destined to be "fulfilled" in the New Covenant. Further, we realize that sacrifices in the Old Testament are not fundamental. "Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?";* "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit";† "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice"‡—such is the deepest voice of the Old Testament.

The early Church developed in a world dominated externally by slavery as an institution and inwardly by fear—of demons, magic, and fate. Many Christians were slaves or freedmen. Is it surprising that ransom became for many the master-word; that the Atonement was construed primarily as a redeeming, a rescuing, from the yoke? Again, it was natural to ask the question: Redeem—from what? pay the price—to whom? To the demons, was the answer, or, more simply, to Satan. We do not believe in demons today, at least we interpret them differently, but we shall be wise in assuming that Origen, for example, *meant* something true and helpful, however difficult his actual formulation may have become for modern minds to make their own. Christ *does* set us free, and fear is once more the characteristic evil of the world. After all, Origen is only working out St. Paul's hint: "which none of the rulers of this world knoweth: for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory."§

The Middle Ages were the time of feudalism. Before the rise of strong centralized states, everyone had to be someone's man, and render him obedience. So we have, in St. Anselm's famous theory, the God-Man offering mankind's obedience to the Father, in reparation for sin. "We cannot but perceive, in the working out of the theory, the influence of contemporary feudal

* Psalm l. 13.

† Psalm li. 17.

‡ Hosea vi. 6 = Matt. ix. 13.

§ 1 Cor. ii. 8: "The archons of this æon" are, almost certainly, the invisible powers of evil; cf. 2 Cor. iv. 4: "the god of this world."

ideas as to the relation of king and subject."* Feudalism has gone, but Anselm's root ideas have permanent validity. So, too, Abelard's "subjective" theory is the parent of much modern thinking.

The sixteenth-century view that justice must be done, that some one must pay the price for man's sin, and that only the Sinless One availed to meet the demands of eternal justice, is too familiar to be more than mentioned. It is in the background of the minds of us all and colours the popular misconceptions of today, such as, that Christians believe in "the wrong man" suffering.

It will be noticed that every one of these approaches, partial and liable to be mixed with elements of error as it may be, is worthy of its theme, in that it harmonizes with the devotional language found in the Church's prayers and hymns. Whereas the typical nineteenth-century theory, in which Jesus hardly does more than show us a loving Father by His teaching and melt our hearts by patient endurance of suffering, makes an atmosphere in which the traditional phrases become strained and unreal. Does not, then, the maxim *lex orandi lex credendi* rule it out?

II

There is something profoundly moving in this spectacle of saints and doctors through the ages grappling with the problem of the Atonement, each generation finding something true and good, which yet fails to help its successors. Perhaps we shall do more honour to the men of old by trying in our turn to express what helps us than by repeating their formulations. What follows is one man's effort to be loyal at once to revealed truth and to the light he seemed to receive when preparing a course of sermons in Lent.†

The argument will advance by three stages. First we must establish the reality of evil, both in individual hearts and in corporate societies—for we can never understand salvation without a lively apprehension of what we are saved from; then we study the victory won by Christ on the Cross; finally we try to see how the suffering of One can avail for many, and find the key in the solidarity of mankind.

There should be little difficulty in winning assent to the proposition that evil is an ever-present reality. The shallow optimism of the last generation, which believed in miracles to

* J. K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 128.

† The influence of G. Aulén's *Christus Victor* will be noticed by those who have read that book. But I have purposely relied only on a vague memory of one reading of it, and have not consulted it again.

be wrought by education, has been shattered by facts. The scientist has always declared that nature is more fundamental than nurture and the psychologist has reinforced belief in the immense importance of what we cannot touch by education—the hidden forces and motives of the mind. Social reform is as disappointing as education. *Prima facie*, what more Christlike action could be imagined than unemployment insurance, by which a man is helped by his fellow-countrymen to help himself in time of need? Yet the abuses of the British system brought the country to the brink of disaster in 1931.

What is this persistent fate which dogs our footsteps when we try to unite in doing good? We look within and, seeing evil there, cease to wonder that we, joining with others, fail to reform the world, when we have failed so badly with what is far more obviously amenable to correction, namely ourselves. Within, the problem is insoluble, at least when attacked by direct methods of self-mastery, for the very success of our efforts strengthens that self-satisfaction and complacency which is the root of sin.

Yes, evil within the souls of ourselves and our neighbours is the root cause of social failure. But that is not all. To many, at least, the facts point to a pervading power of evil which is more than an arithmetical adding up of the evil in individuals. July, 1914, is an obvious example of a time when Europe was in the grip of evil forces which, emanating doubtless from individuals, returned with immense corporate potency. Ordinary citizens were like the units in the mighty river above Niagara Falls, which moves unresisting to the abyss. The atmosphere of evil which broods over a city ruled by an alliance between corrupt bosses and gunmen is another example which occurs at once to the mind.

In the face of such positive manifestations of evil it is difficult to argue seriously with those who hold that evil is merely an absence of good. The gunman is rather selfishness raised to an almost unlimited power. If the bulk of mankind are sheep, he is the wolf, and not many feel the call to be shepherds. It is rather ludicrous to label the self-aggrandizing wolf-spirit as a mere absence of good.

I now wish to pursue a rather speculative line of thought. Why is it that the crowd-spirit is usually evil rather than good? For the evil of the crowd does seem to exceed the aggregate of the individual evil elements that compose it. I think that something may take place comparable with what happens in physics when an agglomeration of particles becomes large enough to acquire *mass* and coherence. A large body has physical characteristics of its own, by virtue of its size. The

evil passions, then, of a crowd of men may create a kind of Frankenstein's monster which has a transitory but real potency to influence the course of events and to suggest evil to the members of the crowd.* Apply this thought to the human race and you get a conception of the devil and his angels being an emanation from human evil, having a real but limited power, and destined ultimately to disappear.†

This is put forward as a consideration which may cause some, who think the idea of Satan purely mythological, to reconsider their position. For myself, I am content to accept the symbolism—the mythology, if the word is not offensive—of the New Testament as a necessary intellectual formulation of important factors in the spiritual world, as perceived by Jesus and His apostles, whose insight in these matters is final. I find that the spiritual experience represented in the New Testament agrees with the conviction forced on me by the facts of life, that there is an organized realm of evil, possibly emanating from men, but certainly reacting on them with mighty quasi-personal‡ influence.

III

Into a world of failure and sin came God the Son, to save the world. This is fundamental. We must not think of human nature deified in Jesus, at last strong enough to overcome evil. God was the victor, not man. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself" (2 Cor. v. 18) is the unequalled Apostolic formulation of the Atonement. But God used the same human nature that had failed hitherto, and employed none but the weapons open to all men. The Temptation narrative tells us that other weapons presented themselves to our Lord's mind and were rejected.§ Our Lord was no recluse, rather He multiplied contacts with His fellow-men, with all that such contacts imply of stress and strain. He faced failure, ingratitude, injustice, man's inhumanity to man, the badness of good men, finally torture, death, and the shipwreck

* Would this argument be applicable to good? Up to a point; but the Christian believes that good in the individual heart is the fruit of the Holy Spirit, and that the group-meeting is the ordained way by which a more intense appreciation and renewing of the Spirit is obtained.

† A good many floating and unco-ordinated beliefs connected with "elementals," haunted houses, and the like, begin to make sense in the light of this theory.

‡ Personality is so associated with the individuality of a human being that one is reluctant to apply the word to Satan.

§ We shall probably hold that, given the conditions of the Incarnation, Jesus *could* not have floated down from the Temple, however great his trust in the Father. So defeat in this temptation would have meant yielding to phantasy and daydream, a psychological disaster.

of all that this life offers of good, and "in a sore conflict God gave Him the victory." *To the end He never lost faith, hope and love.* That is the supreme victory, the perfect vindication of the possibilities of human nature. It is a reversal of ordinary values, and apart from the Resurrection we should never have known that it was victory. But the Cross is the victory, the Atonement; and not either the Incarnation or the Resurrection, as some are half inclined to say.

We must expand this thought a little. Faith was triumphant when Jesus up to the bitter end never lost perfect consciousness of Sonship. Hope triumphed when, about to die, He looked forward to eating the passover in the kingdom of God with His disciples on the other side of death (St. Luke xxii. 16, 18). Love had its perfect expression in terms of human life and thought when He washed the disciples' feet and uttered the words recorded in St. John xiii.-xvi., which, however amplified by the reflection and experience of the Church, must assuredly go back to an original nucleus of flaming self-expression on the part of the Master.

The Passion was both active and passive. The very word victory implies activity. Jesus made the Cross sacrificial, and prevailing for others, by His offering of the separated Body and Blood in the Upper Room. But activity was consistent with complete and utter passivity, when He was led as a lamb to the slaughter and "none of the rulers of this world" knew what he was doing.

At this point we must return to the thought of the previous section. The victory was twofold, over the potentiality of sin and failure within, and over evil without. The inner conflict centred round Sonship, the possibility of failing in faith and trust, and thus ceasing to be the perfect Son of the heavenly Father. This is typified by the first Temptation. The outer conflict was concerned with the social and corporate life of humanity. This is where good men fail. They may order their private lives reasonably well, or, shunning the conflict, practise a fugitive cloistered virtue; but if they mingle freely with their fellow-men they are inevitably involved in the compromises of the double standard. Now it is in social and political life that organized corporate evil, as we have discussed it above, arises. Jesus met and conquered this by complete surrender. There is a proverb, "Give him enough rope and he'll hang himself." This, I think, is what the Fathers meant by their teaching about the ransom paid to the devil. It was necessary that death's mightiest powers should do their worst and be proved impotent by the Resurrection.

We conclude that the Cross was the victory, and was revealed

as such by the Resurrection.* Needless to add that our "explanation" lands us in inexplicable mystery, but it is none the worse for that.

IV

Is this all? Have we not explained away the Atonement? What has become of the cosmic change which we are accustomed to associate with the Cross?

I cannot conceive a greater victory than that man in himself should live the life of perfect Sonship, even to the point of sacrificing life itself to maintain it. But, to realize the completeness of the victory, we must remember the solidarity of mankind. All men have the same bodies, or the surgeon's operations would be impossible; the human mind works according to certain uniform laws, upon which psychologists can rely.† It is not hard to believe that there is a spiritual unity of mankind which has been affected once and for all by the triumph of the God-Man. So at least St. Paul teaches. "Through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life" (Rom. v. 18). "That He might create in *Himself* of the twain (Jew and Gentile) *one new man*" (Eph. ii. 15). The status of humanity has been changed, however much some may repudiate it, by the re-creative act of God in Christ. This is quite a different thought from that of mystical identification with the Cross, an act of spiritual adherence to Christ which is in essence something we do, and seems as if it can be practised only by those of a certain temperament. It is something objective, a change in the nature of things, in that the inherent weakness and sin of man, within the individual and still more in his corporate relations, has been ended by the obedience, sacrifice, and triumph of the Head of our race. The "interpretation" is simplicity itself and may be stated in a few words. The victory was won in the soul of one Man; it possessed a quality differing from all other victories; it was won by God's re-creating act, through common human nature; owing to the solidarity of mankind it gave a new status to man.

If, finally, one asks why the difference is not unmistakably clear, the answer would be two-fold. In the first place, the Christian life at its best is something new and positive, reproducing the victorious life of the Master. It has a glow, an *élan*, about it which is absent from even the saintliest types of

* One interpretation of Heb. xii. 1, 2 may be mentioned, though I personally am not convinced it is right. "Let us run with patience *the race that is set before us* (τὸν προκείμενον ἡμῖν ἀγῶνα), looking unto Jesus . . . who, *for the joy that was set before Him* (ἀντὶ τῆς προκειμένης αὐτῷ χαρᾶς), endured the cross." As what is set before us is the race, what is set before Him is defined as the joy of battle, the Cross.

† Though individual psychology is necessary, because in each man the uniform human motives are coloured owing to their passing through the strata of his unique personality.

Buddhism. And, secondly, we must be patient. The same Scriptures which tell us of a world made new by the Cross bid us "work out our own salvation with fear and trembling"—a tedious life-long task. That a thousand years in God's sight are but as yesterday is not a preacher's tag, but sober truth in the light of the agelong purpose of God revealed to faith by modern astronomy. The Church has barely finished the second day of her life on earth. Christ has won our souls by the Cross, but we too must make the victory ours, by patience.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.—Can the theory, briefly stated above, by which evil spirits are regarded as an emanation from men, be extended to the angels? There is a radical difference between evil, which is allowed, not created, by God, and good, directly created by Him. The attractiveness of the theory lies in our reluctance to ascribe to God the creation of beings destined to become wholly evil; no such factor is present in the case of good angels.

All the same, the N.T. passages in which "angel" is used followed by a genitive describing human beings are worth studying in this connection. The angels of men obviously cannot of necessity be identified with the angels of God.

Matt. xviii. 10: "their angels (these little ones) do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven." This is best interpreted in the light of Acts xii. 15: "It is his angel," his double, his counterpart, almost his "astral body." Men have heavenly counterparts, by whom they are protected. The Rabbis discussed their nature in the light of a developed angelology. It is at least possible that in these two N.T. passages the angels of men are not identical with the bright spirits round the throne. In Matt. xviii. 10 the idea is that the protectors and advocates of the helpless have continual access to the throne of the Judge and Father of all, as against the Rabbinic doctrine that angels generally, as distinguished from those of the highest rank, are debarred from seeing God's face.

The angels of the Churches in Rev. ii., iii. are personifications of the characteristics of the communities. The author conceives of them realistically; they are no mere figure of speech or poetic license, but actual beings, other than human, capable of receiving praise or blame. Suppose that the Russian Bear, or American Eagle, of a political cartoon were taken not as a mere symbol, but as a super-human reality, and you get an analogy to the writer's meaning. We may conclude that our theory of an evil group-spirit created by men would not have been alien to his way of thinking.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE MESSAGE AND THEOLOGY OF BARTH AND BRUNNER

II. RECONCILIATION AND GRACE

THE clearest of Barth's interpreters is Professor Emil Brunner of Zurich, and he is a constructive interpreter who expands and builds upon the prophet's message. Barth's ideas on reconciliation and atonement have not yet been gathered together in a formal discussion. No doubt that will come in the second volume of the *Dogmatik*. But they are clearly expressed in many passages scattered throughout the *Römerbrief*. To this question Brunner has addressed himself in the *Mittler*, and we shall summarize his teaching from that book.

Brunner bases his interpretation of the function of the Mediator upon the fact and reality of sin in human nature. In the speculative systems of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and others there is no adequate comprehension of evil. The presence of what is called evil is not denied, but it is apparent only. Evil is not comprehended as opposition to the will of God, still less as guilt and sin. Among idealist philosophers Kant is more helpful. He recognizes evil as a positive opposition of the will against the law of good, and Ritschl goes farther still by defining evil or sin as opposition to the divine will (pp. 100-110). Brunner goes deeper. Not only does man commit evil or sin, he is evil and a sinner. A sinner is not merely a man who sins on repeated occasion, he is one who is sinful in all that he does (p. 117). Sin is offence against God, and destroys the personal relation between man and God. The original personal relation between the Creator and the creature has thereby been changed. Between God and man now lies guilt, and guilt is the sign of lost fellowship. Guilt is objective, not merely subjective, and in its positive grounding arouses the anger of God. That is now the new attitude of God to man—He is angry with him on account of his sin. Man's wilful opposition to God, his autonomy, is equivalent to self-legislation. Man sets himself up as a fellow-lawgiver with God, and so sits on God's Throne (p. 123 ff.). The honour of God is attacked through sin against God. But God cannot permit His honour to be attacked. He would cease to be God if He did. The law of the divine nature in which all the legality of the world rests, demands a divine reaction against sin, the divine opposition to its rebellion and breach of the divine order. That God does not allow Himself to be mocked, that He will not permit His honour to be attacked,

that He punishes him who rebels against Him, is the ground of all world order (p. 401).

So punishment is due to man and he lies under sentence. The divine anger-justice implies death, and there is no human condition under which we should expect that He will forgive. He can forgive or not forgive, and this freedom belongs to the being of God (p. 402 ff.). Punishment belongs to guilt, but there is an inward necessity in it. If with sin, man's relation to God is changed, and with it the being of man, so also something in God is changed—God is not forgetful. He must punish from an urgency which lies in the divine holiness (pp. 414-426).

If man cannot live without God, he cannot on the contrary live with Him so long as guilt is unreconciled. Now only an extraordinary event can remove the necessity for the punishment of our guilt by death. Only God Himself can effect this (p. 435 f.). Here enters the function of the divine Mediator. In contrast with all other religions Christianity is belief in a Mediator; no other religion recognises this category of once-for-allness (*ἐφ' ἅπασι*). There is no immediate relationship with God, only a mediate relationship. Between God and the soul stands the Mediator, who holds both apart, and yet unites them. Through Him alone God reveals Himself (pp. 11 f., 22). In Him alone comes complete recognition of sin, and this recognition is the requisite preliminary for faith in the Mediator. Only necessity teaches us to pray, and only in despair can faith be known; a right despair alone leads on to faith (p. 125 f.).

The mediatorship of Christ is the sphere of revelation and supplies concreteness and actuality to the revelation-event. His revealing function is a new category quite different from that of the prophets, who none the less all proclaimed His coming. He is the Word of God in personal form. The question "Who is He?" means the same as "What has God to say in Him?" (pp. 194-205, 444). Yet His mediatorship is fundamental to Himself. It is not dependent upon His special relation to the world. This is expressed by Trinitarian doctrine. The Word, the self-mediator is eternal in God Himself (p. 248 f.). This divine mediatorship is fulfilled when He comes to the creature who has separated himself from God by sin, and who has no right even to know God save as the One who is angry (pp. 259-264). The plan of the Incarnation is related rather to sinful fallen humanity than to man as a creature. In the Incarnation Jesus Christ did not assume the simple *person* of man, but human nature (pp. 280 ff.). In this complete mediation, and in its necessity, rests immediacy between God and man (p. 303). The capacity of mediation is twofold. Christ is the Mediator with God, over man, and the Mediator with man, under God (p. 317).

So there is a twofold function in the Incarnation. Christ comes as the Mediator of revelation, and as the Mediator of reconciliation (p. 366). His mediatorship does not rest in His teaching, but in His being, in the mystery of His being. It consists no more in His teaching than in His merely historical personality (p. 386 f.). Here appears the Barthian contrast between the living divine content of revelation, and the merely human instrument, whether spoken word or event or person, in history. The mere Jesus of History is not sufficient (*cf.* Brunner, pp. 137, 157).

The message of the Cross is the central mystery of the Biblical evangel. It is not the duty of theology to explain this mystery, if it could do so its explanation would be merely contingent. The Cross set up the offence and folly of the Christian revelation, as Isaiah liii. had already proclaimed (pp. 393 ff., 461). The offering of Christ takes place before all the world, because sin is not the mere private act of individuals, but is also at the same time world-sin. (p. 407). The Cross sets up God as self-effacing (p. 437). By its virtue God's Son comes through the inhibitive fire of the divine anger, and so reveals the divine mercy, and reveals the nature of the divine love by the greatness of the opposition which it overcomes—the opposition set up by righteous anger as well as human sin (p. 440 f.).

The Cross is inseparably bound up with the Incarnation. Christ enters into solidarity with the human race. The Mediator gives Himself to the anger-suffering of God by coming to men from God. The sufferings of Christ are not confined to the Cross. They begin with His coming. Revelation itself is a breaking-through the divine anger by divine love (pp. 444-471). The significance of the Cross is thus reconciliation and revelation, and reconciliation is the beginning of salvation, which issues in resurrection (pp. 456-517). Thus only in the Mediator is the love of God known (p. 550).

The kinship between the teaching of Barth and Brunner becomes clear when we turn to Barth's commentary on the Romans. Reconciliation with God takes place through death, through the blood of Jesus, in the absolute offence of His death on the Cross. In His blood Jesus proves Himself to be the Christ, the first and last word of the faithful God to the human race. On the way to His cross, in the surrender there of His life, in His death, the radicalism of the salvation which He thereby brings to us comes to light. The mystery of the reconciliation in the blood of Jesus is and remains the mystery of God. Here lies the reality of the mercy of God, the wonder of the riches of divine goodness, of the curbing of His anger, of the divine forbearance (p. 80 f.).

Peace with God means peace concluded between man and God, brought about by a change in human character, proceeding from God, through the recovery of the normal relation of the creature to the Creator, through the grounding of love for God, which has its beginning in the fear of the Lord. *Our* love is *without* the fear of the Lord, and places us under the anger of God, in the ranks of His enemies (p. 127).

The new man lives by the dying Christ, and the life of Christ is made visible by His death on the Cross, and only there (p. 136). In a visible temporal sense we are changed with Christ, and this change is a parable and analogy of His death (p. 176). The death which He dies is life; that No! which He announces is Yes! The opposition of man to God is here revealed in the reconciliation (p. 183). Where the dead body of Christ becomes the non-being of man, there is reconciliation, forgiveness, judgment, salvation. Out of *this* death comes life (p. 216). Reconciliation is in fact identical with revelation. When the Son of God becomes man, there is carried out in time the overcoming of the opposition between God and man. That God reveals Himself means that God reveals Himself as Reconciler (*Dogmatik*, I. 257).

Karl Barth has been accused of over-emphasizing the doctrine of the transcendence of God, and there is no doubt that in the *Römerbrief* he does lay great stress upon this aspect of God. But in so far as that work is a vigorous protest against the over-emphasis of immanence in contemporary theology, it is hardly fair to dispute with him on this ground, especially since his earlier teaching has been adjusted in later writings. Brunner rightly says: "Much nonsense has been talked about the 'Barthian Theology' having perception only for the transcendence of God, not for His immanence" (*Word and the World*, p. 7).

In the *Dogmatik* Barth admits that Trinitarian doctrine is the product of the Church, yet she did not discover this doctrine for herself. Its elements are to be found in the testimony of revelation which founded the Church (I. 151; Brunner, pp. 149, 247 f.). The doctrine of the Trinity is a legitimate answer to the possibility of revelation of the Father, when enquiry originally and rightly directs itself to God, to the whole God (*ibid.*, p. 198). The Father is not without the Son, and the Son is not without the Spirit of the Father and the Son (*ibid.*, p. 414). We must accept the doctrine of the double procession of the Spirit, although like the doctrine of the generation of the Son, it remains a mystery. It expresses the New Testament conception of the Spirit (*ibid.*, p. 213 f.).

The function of the Spirit in the Christian life is to impart

grace and faith. Evil in man is unbelief, which takes the form of a refusal to consent to the work of the Word and the Spirit. We stand over against that work as impotent creatures, sinfully unwilling, rebels in God's kingdom. While we desire all that is noble, remedial and good, we do not permit ourselves to open, prepare and equip ourselves for God through God. Grace is the kingdom of God. Our enmity against God, the evil that we do, is enmity against grace. Grace which reconciles for sin is the Spirit of God the Reconciler, not the Spirit of truth, goodness and beauty. The particular and veritable sin of man is enmity to this grace. Where any human purpose or form is made a stipulation of communion with God, the Holy Ghost is forgotten (Barth, *Zur Lehre vom Heiligengeist*, p. 56 f.; Brunner, p. 251).

Even the Christian man does not know that he is a sinner. Like justification, the knowledge of man's sinful condition is a revelation from God, through the Word of God spoken in the Cross of Christ by the Holy Ghost (*ibid.*, p. 69 ff.). If in the contest faith triumphs over unbelief, it is the Holy Spirit who triumphs within the human spirit. Faith with its experience of judgment and justification is the work of God in man. "I believe" means "I exist in faith." My existence in such a condition is not my faith. It is God's work in me, and includes justification and sanctification (p. 79 ff.).

The question where, how and from whom the Christian life can be lived is not the concern of history, psychology or sociology, but of theology (p. 47). It is made known to man by revelation, through an outpouring of the Holy Ghost, the gift of grace, and this constitutes the fundamental significance of the Holy Spirit for the Christian life (p. 48). Our being made in the likeness of God is a continuing process, not an accomplished fact, it is *dandum*, not *datum* (p. 44 f.). There is no inherent continuity between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God, but a discontinuity, the contrast between the creature and Creator (p. 43; Brunner, p. 98). God has created us, but we do not know this till the Spirit makes it known (p. 49), and this knowledge is the second miracle of creative love mediated by the Holy Spirit (p. 51). This hearing of the creative Word of God, which makes human life Christian life, is not human work, but the work of the Holy Spirit. As our spirit cannot produce the Word of God, so it cannot receive it (p. 53). This is the office of the Holy Spirit. In the Holy Spirit man believes. In the Holy Spirit he hears. In the Holy Spirit he prays (p. 55). That we have peace with God means "I" and the Spirit within me, so that *ego* becomes *nos* (*Römerbrief*, i. 135). We pray in the Holy Spirit. The wonder of prayer is the intercession of the Holy Spirit for the one who prays. The sighs of the Spirit make Him the actual petitioner

(*Lehre vom Heiligengeist*, p. 102 ff.). In the Holy Ghost we have a conscience, we *know with* God the difference between good and evil (p. 101).

It is hardly necessary to expand the assertion that this teaching allows full scope for the idea of the immanence of God in the Barthian theology. "Who is God? The Spirit in His believers—which will and must break forth from quiet hearts into the world outside, that it may be manifest, visible, comprehensible: behold the tabernacle of God is with men. The Holy Spirit makes a new heaven and therefore, new men, new families, new relationships, new politics. It has no respect for old traditions simply because they are traditions, for old solemnities simply because they are solemn, for old powers simply because they are powerful. The *Holy Spirit* has respect only for truth, for itself. The Holy Spirit establishes the righteousness of heaven in the midst of the unrighteousness of earth and will not stop nor stay until all that is dead has been brought to life and a new *world* has come into being" (*Word of God and the World*, p. 49 f.).

While the spirit of man is distinct from God, and is set up over against Him, yet God is immanent in the believer by His own gift of faith, in the Person of the Holy Spirit. To quote Barth again, the significance of the Holy Spirit for the Christian life, in the light of the opposition between grace and sin, lies in the special pregnancy of the fact that the Spirit of Jesus Christ, of the Son of God crucified for us in the flesh, the Spirit of the Word spoken to us, is the Spirit of the Father, and therefore cannot be identified with our spirit in its operation (*Heiligengeist*, p. 65 f.).

The presence of the Holy Spirit in man then is the agent of grace, faith and sanctification. He also fulfils an eschatological function. The finality of the promises of God to us lies in the future—our salvation, resurrection and eternal life. While God promises us our salvation, He is present with us in His promise. He is the "Spirit of Promise" through whom we were sealed to the day of salvation (Eph. i. 13-14, iv. 30; *ibid.*, p. 94 ff.). Our childhood in God is eschatological; it is in process of being effected; its finality is yet to be. We are not children of God because we are His creatures, nor merely because His grace is mighty for our sins. In our present there is always our divine future; and our last actual condition, willed by God, is our present condition. We are the heirs of the promise, not those who possess it. Yet our divine future is present through the Word. The last unshakable, final, special gift of the Holy Spirit is always coming, never already come. So only in the Holy Spirit of promise are we children of God. In the kingdom of creation we are servants, in the kingdom of reconciliation we are subjected

enemies, in the kingdom of salvation we are children of God (*ibid.*, p. 97 ff.).

This special relationship of God to the believer does not exclude His general relationship to nature and mankind. Brunner maintains that we must believe "in a general revelation of God in creation, history, and especially in conscience," and "no religion is wholly without truth," but "it must be realized that the general revelation is broken" by sin (*Mittler*, p. 13 f.).

A. J. MACDONALD.

(*To be concluded*)

VICISSITUDES OF CATHOLICISM IN MODERN FRANCE—II.

THE establishment of the French Church under the Concordat of 1802 lasted for just over a hundred years, a period almost exactly coincident with the nineteenth century. The Concordat itself was a diplomatic treaty between the Pope and the First Consul and dealt only with general principles and a few immediate issues. Details of organization were contained in the Organic Articles which were drawn up and promulgated by the State without consulting the Pope. Throughout the period the Papacy continued to protest against them and to press for their repeal, but the Government always asserted that they were merely the practical working out of the principles laid down by the Concordat and that the two formed an indissoluble whole.

The Concordat was due less to any enthusiasm for the cause of religion on the part of Napoleon than to his desire to win the political support of the Church for himself. For a time he succeeded, but relations gradually became strained and the latter years of his reign were filled with an acute conflict with Pius VII. It may, however, reasonably be maintained that this conflict, though it alienated the sympathies of the clergy from Napoleon, was rather between Pope and Emperor than between Church and State; as such it falls outside the main stream of events and can be left aside here. It is more important to consider the Napoleonic legislation on two matters which even to-day remain the chief ground of controversy between Church and State—the control of education and the position of the religious orders.

The University of France, founded by Napoleon in 1808, was an attempt to provide a State educational system analogous to a State religion; it was a highly centralised corporation, nominally autonomous, but actually under the control of the Government.

All who were engaged in the teaching profession in France belonged to the University, and no school might be opened except with its permission and under its control. The University was much attacked by Catholics on the ground that it was anti-religious—though in fact this often meant little more than that others besides Catholics were members of the University—and their efforts led to the gradual abolition of the State monopoly of education. Permission to found independent schools, privately supported and free from the control of the University, was secured in 1833 and 1850 for elementary and secondary education respectively. As a result many thousands of *écoles libres* were founded, nearly all by the Church. But the University, though it has lost its monopoly and has acquired greater freedom of organization, still exists as the sum of all State-supported schools and universities.

The religious orders had been dissolved in 1790 and prohibited in 1792, and no mention of their restoration was made in the Concordat. Moreover under the *Code Civil* no association of any kind or for any object, consisting of more than 20 persons, might be formed without Government authorisation. Napoleon granted such authorization to five orders of men—the congregations of St. Lazare, St. Esprit and the Missions Étrangères, the Sulpicians and the Frères de la Doctrine Chrétienne—and to some 95 orders of women. But during the remainder of the century no other orders of men even requested authorization, though they gradually established themselves in France. They were strictly in an extra-legal and even an illegal position; but, apart from occasional attacks on the Jesuits, they were tolerated because no Government felt sufficiently confident of its own strength and of popular favour to raise the storm that would inevitably result from any attempt to interfere with them.

After the fall of Napoleon attempts were made to abrogate the Concordat of 1802 and to substitute one which would have given the Church greater power and independence. One of the terms of the Concordat was that the Pope accepted the secularization of the ecclesiastical estates in 1789 and the State promised to provide for the clergy; and by the Organic Articles this provision was made in the form of an annual payment from the Budget. It was now proposed, instead of this, to hand over to the Church a capital sum in land or bonds of equal value. But the Parliament refused to sanction a measure whereby the State would have lost its chief means of controlling the Church, and the negotiations came to nothing. The Concordat, like the University, was retained provisionally, and this provisional measure proved to be permanent.

The identification of religion with political reaction during

the period of the Restoration, due to the unbounded enthusiasm with which the clergy supported the cause of the Bourbons who had delivered them from Napoleon, caused the Revolution of 1830 to be directed almost as much against the Altar as the Throne. Consequently the July Monarchy was anti-clerical in tone and the Church lost official favour. But Catholicism deserted by the Government turned to the people, and from being reactionary became predominantly liberal in attitude. It was the period of the great educational controversy, and Montalembert, who led the Catholic attack on the University monopoly, won popularity for the Church by his insistence that she did not demand privileges for herself but stood for the equal liberty of all. For this reason the February Revolution of 1848 was not at all hostile to the Church nor the Church to the Second Republic. But the apparent harmony of religion and democracy only lasted four months. The proletarian rising of the Days of June caused Catholics to draw back in horror and to welcome the advent of Louis Napoleon as the only man who could save France from socialism and anarchy. The Church abandoned liberalism and once again identified herself with complete reaction, intellectual as well as political.

The Second Empire is chiefly important for the growth of the rival theories of Ultramontanism and of the Revolution. Ultramontanism involved not merely the theological doctrine of papal infallibility, but the whole series of ideas which reached their fullest expression in the Syllabus of 1864 with its famous condemnation of the proposition that "the Roman Pontiff can or ought to reconcile himself and come to terms with progress, liberalism or recent civilization." Whatever the true interpretation of that phrase, it was taken by almost all contemporaries, friends as well as foes, to mean the utter condemnation of the opposing series of ideas gathered round the French Revolution. To the thorough-going Republican of the time *la Révolution* was not a historical event in which good and bad were blended, but a wholly admirable body of doctrine which included all developments of democracy, science and modern thought. To all these things, and not merely to their abuses, Catholicism appeared to be opposed. From the middle of the century onwards both Catholics and Republicans seemed to take a pleasure in emphasizing the divergence of their ideas and the incompatibility of their systems.

It was this apparent incompatibility, rather than the accidental identification of Catholicism with Royalism in the seventies, which was the cause of the hostility between Church and State during most of the Third Republic. Conflict began after the Republicans came to power in 1879. They proceeded

first to expel the Jesuits and a number of other religious orders whom they regarded as the chief exponents of an Ultramontanism incompatible with the existence of a modern State, and secondly to reorganize the system of elementary education. It is unnecessary to recount here the whole series of reforms, but the stubborn opposition which Catholics raised to each measure, however necessary, because they saw in it a covert attack on the Church, did much to embitter the whole controversy and to increase the popular identification of Catholicism with complete reaction. The chief bone of contention was the question of the *laïcité* of the education to be given in the State elementary schools. The word *laïcité* cannot be translated, but it may be roughly defined, and the controversy explained, by saying that the Republicans identified it with "secularity" and the Catholics with "secularism." Though it is true that most of those who demanded *laïcité* were personally hostile to the Church, there is no reason to doubt that in the intention of Jules Ferry, the chief inspirer of these reforms, it was to be a real neutrality in matters of religion. But Catholics maintained that neutrality was ultimately equivalent to hostility, and the fact that it has resulted in a conflict between priest and schoolmaster in every French village is at least in part due to the suspicion with which the whole scheme was originally greeted by the clergy. Even today, fifty years after their promulgation, the *lois laïques* are a vital issue in French politics, and more than anything else form the dividing-line between Left and Right.

After 1892, when Leo XIII. instructed French Catholics that they were no longer to oppose the Republic on principle, but were to attempt to reform it from inside, relations of Church and State considerably improved, though many Republicans thought that Catholics were more to be feared now than they had been as open enemies. The Dreyfus Affair seemed to confirm this view, and to show that the power of the Church, and in particular of the religious orders who had all returned with increased force since their expulsion in 1880, was increasing to a point dangerous to the State. At the close of the nineteenth century anti-clericalism had revived and was more powerful than at any time previously.

Under these circumstances Waldeck-Rousseau attempted to settle the problem of the religious orders, and at the same time to deal with the whole question of the right of association which was still under the extremely restrictive Napoleonic legislation. His proposal would have placed all forms of association on an equal footing, but during its passage through the Chamber the bill was greatly amended in an anti-clerical sense, so that, while other societies might be formed on easier terms than originally

intended, religious orders required authorization not merely by administrative decree but by vote of Parliament.

As a result of this *loi du 1er juillet* 1901, more than 70 orders of men and 200 of women went into exile without even applying for authorization, while 63 orders of men and 400 of women made application. Before they came up for discussion, Waldeck-Rousseau retired (June 3, 1902), and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Emile Combes, a fanatical anti-clerical, who proceeded to execute the law in a manner contrary both to all ideas of fairness and to the intentions of its author. The culmination came when, instead of presenting the applications for authorization singly or in reasonable grouping, he lumped them in three Bills—for Preaching, Teaching and Trading* orders respectively—which were all rejected by the Chamber. This procedure frustrated Waldeck-Rousseau's whole object, which had been to make an equitable discrimination between the orders and to authorize those considered to be harmless or beneficial to the country. The orders thus proscribed either dissolved themselves or went into exile in England, Belgium, or Spain. Five missionary orders which Combes had intended to authorise, and most of the orders of women, have never been discussed, and to this day exist in provisional toleration.

Having thus dealt with the religious orders, Combes proceeded to accentuate the conflict between Church and State till it should reach a point at which separation became practical politics. He considered that separation was inevitable in the long run, and that it would be best to hasten it, but, as he afterwards admitted, he wanted to make the actual rupture come from the side of the Church. Fate and the Papacy played into his hands in bringing this about.

The Concordat had provided that bishops were to be appointed by the Government and instituted by the Pope. During the last thirty years the custom had grown up that, in order to avoid direct rejection of their candidate by the Pope, the Government should consult the Nuncio before making the appointment. Combes declared that this was a restriction on the rights of the State and made several appointments without previous consultation. The Pope refused to grant canonical institution to those thus appointed. On the other hand, the formula *nominavit* in the bulls of institution had latterly been changed by the Roman authorities to *nobis nominavit*, implying that the Government did not nominate but only suggested names to the Pope. Combes refused to accept bishops whose bulls contained the offending phrase, and the Pope refused to modify it. Compromise was on the point of being reached when Leo XIII. died

* The third category consisted of the Carthusians alone.

(July 30, 1903), and was succeeded by the intransigent Pius X. The deadlock continued, and by the time the separation was accomplished fourteen dioceses were vacant.

A second point of controversy soon arose. In 1903 the King of Italy paid an official visit to Paris. Next year the French President had to return the visit to Rome. But since 1870 no Catholic sovereign who visited the Quirinal had been received at the Vatican. It was ascertained that the Pope would not modify the Protocol in favour of France, and, in order to avoid the affront of a refusal, it was decided that the President should not even request an audience of the Pope. Most Frenchmen, whether they were Catholics or not, felt that this was a wise solution of an admitted difficulty, and when the Pope nevertheless issued a formal diplomatic protest there was widespread resentment.

Almost simultaneously with this, in the summer of 1904, the bishops of Laval and Dijon were summoned to Rome to be tried by the Inquisition for canonical offences. The bishops appealed to the Government, which forbade them to leave their dioceses and intimated to the Pope that the summons was a contravention of the Concordat. Nevertheless the Pope insisted, and the bishops ultimately gave way and went to Rome, where they were deposed without trial, not on the original charges but for having revealed ecclesiastical documents to the secular power. The Government meanwhile declared that it interpreted the whole affair as an indication that the Pope no longer desired the maintenance of the Concordat and broke off diplomatic relations. The separation of Church and State was an inevitable consequence: a bill to effect it was introduced which ultimately became the *loi du 9 décembre 1905*.

The chief question here as in the Concordat was the financial provision for the Church. The annual subvention to the Church was to cease, and no compensation was given for property secularized in 1789, but pensions were to be paid to all priests over 45 years of age for the rest of their lives. Churches, *évêchés*, seminaries and presbyteries were to remain the property of the nation, but churches were to be used rent free by the clergy and the other buildings might be let to them. Property acquired by the Church since the Concordat was to be transferred to new bodies called *associations cultuelles*, which were to be formed in every parish to provide for the maintenance of the fabric and services of the Church. Such property as was not claimed by these bodies within a year was to be sequestrated and devoted to charitable purposes. Considering the heated feeling of the time it was a not unjust settlement, but it came up against the inherent difficulty that it is not possible simply to disestablish a

Church. Some future form of legal constitution must be provided, which can either be included by the State in the act of disestablishment or left to the Church to draw up afterwards. In this case the Government adopted the former alternative and did not even consult the Church whether the type of constitution provided by the *associations cultuelles* was likely to be acceptable.

The result of this high-handed procedure was seen when the Pope in two Encyclicals condemned the law and forbade the formation of *associations cultuelles* on the ground that they were contrary to the divine ordering of the Church and did not adequately guarantee the rights of the hierarchy. Consequently by the end of the year 1906 none had been formed, and according to the provisions of the law all ecclesiastical property should have been sequestrated and all churches closed in default of the proper bodies to take them over. To obviate the suspension of religious services, which would have resulted from this and which might have led to very serious consequences, the Government announced that the clergy might continue to make use of the churches on the sole condition of declaring annually their intention of doing so. When the Pope refused to permit even this declaration, which was in no sense a request for permission, the Government lost patience, sequestrated all the unclaimed property, evicted the occupants from *évêchés* and seminaries, and stopped the payment of the pensions provided by the law. The churches were left open at the free disposal of the clergy, who had, however, no legal title to them.

The Separation was not a very creditable act for any one concerned in it—except for Briand, who was mainly responsible for piloting it through the Chamber and for its peaceful application afterwards amid very great difficulties. The suppression of the *Budget des Cultes* without compensation may have been a hard measure, but it must be remembered that the loss of all the other ecclesiastical property was not due to the will of the State but to the failure of the Church to fulfil the required conditions, which meant that only half the provisions of the law ever came into force. The refusal of the Church to form *associations cultuelles* may have been justified, and the renunciation of all her material wealth for a principle should have been a noble gesture, but constant complaining and talk of spoliation made it seem like a party move. The refusal of the Pope to accept any compromise seemed to show a blind intransigence and a desire to foment civil war in France. Its real explanation is to be found in the mutual distrust of the two sides, and this was largely due to the short-sighted policy of Combes. Many of the Radicals had said that they regarded the *associations cultuelles* as a means of “democratizing” and weakening the Church, and,

though the Government had expressly repudiated any such interpretation, there was the example of Combes's treatment of the law of 1901 to show that laws might be carried out contrary to the intentions of their authors. It was better to keep clear at all costs. But the result was that the Church was left without official status or even legal existence in France: she was literally an outlaw.

R. E. BALFOUR.

FAUST AFTER A HUNDRED YEARS

THE hundred years which have elapsed since the death of Goethe are years of many changes both in thought and in feeling, and it would hardly seem today that an appreciation such as that of Seeley forty years ago could still hold true. The argument of Seeley that Goethe was the "great poet nearest to us" is still true, of course, in point of time, but in other respects as great a gulf seems to divide us from him as from Dante; and the world we live in, of expressionistic psychology and revolutionary politics, seems as remote from the one as from the other. We feel, however, that Seeley's remark is true in a very real sense and that the fame of Goethe, great already as the man of two centuries, the eighteenth and nineteenth, may be increased by one of the twentieth, one based above all on his life-work and masterpiece, *Faust*.

We make this assertion so confidently for a very simple reason. It happens that Faust stands, as a poetic creation, at the point of fusion of two very different currents of thought, one the Rousseauistic philosophy of feeling, the other the philosophy of restraint of the classical tradition, and that the development of Faust himself from the one to the other is an experience well worthy of the closest attention. Both the early and the later Faust derive their origin from the same poet, both are expressed in the same individual, but the feature to notice is that, while the Faust of Goethe's youth, the disillusioned and revolting Faust of 1773, mirrors the mentality of today, the Faust of Goethe's riper days, of 1800 and 1830, is precisely the Faust who may heal us, although not, perhaps, without help from other sources. A brief account of the poem from this point of view of Faust's own development will throw light, we think, on the argument, and reveal to some extent the philosophical structure behind.

The Faust of Part One comes before us as a disillusioned student, one who is ardently desirous of knowing—

was die Welt zusammenhält
(what holds the world together),

but who has found, in spite of all his efforts, that the solution is beyond his reach—at least along the prescribed routes of knowledge. Despairing of these, he turns to the study of the occult, hoping to find in the formulas of the Macrocosm and the Earth-spirit the secret which eludes him, only to find, however, that here, too, the path to the infinite is blocked. At this point he should logically have given way to his disappointment, and, indeed, comes very near to doing it when the Earth-spirit rejects him, but, curiously enough, he does not give way, and finds instead a great satisfaction. He discovers by personal experience, both in the vision of the sign of the Macrocosm and in the actual appearance of the Earth-spirit, that although the world mystery is “beyond knowledge,” it is none the less “within experience,” and can be “sensed” by those who believe in it. Now this intuition, if we can call it by this name, is never lost by Faust at any time in his life, and it saves him, in the end, from the consequences of his pact with the devil. It is the aim of the latter, as we should expect, to destroy this sense of mystery, and to satiate Faust so completely that he asks for nothing more, resting content with the experiences of earth. “Faust shall lick the dust,” says Mephistopheles to God in the Prologue, “and will be delighted to do it.” So the two partners, Faust and Mephistopheles, set out through the little world of Part One and the great world of Part Two, through experiences which are genuinely evil and others which are genuinely good, to effect finally, not the conversion of Faust to Mephistopheles, but that of Mephistopheles to Faust.

Many of the difficulties with which the play of *Faust* bristles arise out of the gradual and irregular growth of the drama, extending over some sixty years and representing the fruit of many and various moods. Without attempting to deal with these numerous problems, which do not immediately concern us, it will suffice to remind the reader that although Faust is first presented as a cynic who develops into a libertine, he shows signs, even at the earliest periods, of a thoughtful and philosophical mind, one that is more than either of these, and which is aware of the divine mystery behind all things. Because Faust clings to this belief, he is saved not only from the genuine evil experienced in the Gretchen episodes and the lesser evil of his own selfishness in Part Two, but also from his own disillusioned state of mind, and is led finally to the state of “clearness” which the Lord had prophesied for him in the Prologue. In order to illustrate this point we can safely pass over the crude buffoonery of Auerbach’s Keller and the rejuvenation of Faust in the Witches’ Kitchen, in order to come at once to the episodes dealing with Gretchen, the importance of which, from the point

of view of Faust's life experience, is in the fact that he very nearly commits himself to evil and is saved only by his sense of the mystery.

We should bear in mind that the love of Gretchen for Faust has well-nigh brought her to destruction, and that here, for the only time in the play, the action takes a genuine tragic turn. She has surrendered her body to him, she has unwittingly poisoned her mother with the sleeping draught, and she has drowned the child she bore him, while, to intensify her anguish, Faust himself has disappeared. We are to understand, of course, that the agent behind the catastrophe is as much Mephistopheles as Faust himself, and that we are at this point actually witnessing the culmination of the power of evil, the power invoked by Faust in his pact with the devil. There are consequently two features which deserve particular notice in this crisis, one being the relation of Faust to Mephistopheles, the other that of Gretchen, each of whom come very near to final damnation. Now it was the object of Mephistopheles during this period to keep Faust away from Gretchen, and he takes him, with this purpose in view, to the heights of the Brocken, where, in the literal sense, Hell is let loose for Faust's benefit.

The Walpurgisnacht which is depicted here is a snare for Faust, and one which very nearly enmeshes him. Spellbound by the influence of sorcery, he is about to dance with a pretty devil girl when he suddenly sees a red mouse spring from her mouth, and draws back from the dance—just in time. His withdrawal, saving him from the final union with evil, brings back Gretchen to his mind, a vision of whom appears to him, and he will take no further part. Returning at full speed, he finds Gretchen in prison almost driven mad with despair, and seeing that she still recognises him he tries to persuade her to flee with him. She would probably have done so, had she not become aware, at the critical moment, of the presence of Mephistopheles at his side, the sight of whom has always roused her aversion. This is enough for her, and she refuses to budge. She knows that it is better to die at the hand of justice than to flee in the devil's company. So for both Faust and Gretchen, in one final movement, the power of evil snaps and the essential goodness of life, even tragic life, is maintained. Faust, it is true, is made to feel the full intensity of the horror he has evoked:

Der Menschheit ganzer Jammer faszt mich an
(The height of human woe has seized upon me),

but he will never again be in danger from Mephistopheles, and never again sink to the same depths.

The Second Part of *Faust*, written mainly between 1826 and 1832, reflects the feelings of an older Goethe than the one

who had written Part One, but it forms with it none the less an integral and unbroken whole.* Grown old with its author, it presents the original restless individual still restless and seeking diversion still, but diversion on a considerably higher plane. The conception of an ever "higher" living, one which is definitely an expression of Goethe's mature life, gives birth to the creation of the Helena episode, in which a vision of a healthy and harmonious human life is conjured up, the ideal of a perfect and beautiful human race. The vision of a new Greece, the home of a healthy and sane people:

Here joy, descending to each generation,
Smiles from bright faces still without surcease;
Each is immortal in her age and station,
And sane and gladsome are they and at peace.

(Hier ist das Wohlbehagen erblich
Die Wange heitert wie der Mund,
Ein Jeder ist an seinem Platz unsterblich,
Sie sind zufrieden und gesund.)†

has its own value merely as an ideal, while the halo of beauty which glows round it raises it above the level of mere physical or mental enjoyment. In the thrill of his ecstasy Faust is fully aware that it is but a dream, and is sufficiently awake to see, even in the dream, that life is a "duty" which has to be lived.

Dasein ist Pflicht und wär's ein Augenblick.

(Existence is a duty, if only lasting a moment.)

As it happens, the Helena episode turns out to be only an *Augenblick*, fading away before his very eyes, but in seizing and holding on to the mantle of Helen, Faust keeps his grip on the "mystery," and remains in his *Dasein* to fulfil his earthly duty.

The fifth Act of Part Two, which repeats emphatically the lesson of the whole, reveals also a feature which had not been clear before. In recognition of his services to the Empire, Faust has been granted the feudal ownership of a strip of territory along the shore, lately covered by water, but which, by dint of hard work, he has turned into a prosperous land inhabited by a multitude of industrious people. Unfortunately there happen to be two old people, Baucis and Philemon, who block the way to the full satisfaction of this aim, and who insist, in spite of all his offers to settle them elsewhere, on remaining in their little house. Mephistopheles thereupon suggests that they should be removed by force, and Faust, in a fit of irritation at their obstinacy, allows him to remove them. Mephistopheles does not merely remove them, he destroys them, and this last act of wanton destruction shakes Faust out of his unreflective

* The Helena was written earlier.

† I am indebted for the translations in this essay to the recent work on *Faust* by F. Melian Stawell.

and selfish imperialism. In the last scenes, in which Faust is superintending the work of his men on the shore, he delivers, in no uncertain terms, a sort of verdict on his life, a summing-up of the value of it for himself and for us:

Could I but banish sorcery, forget
My magic, stand, stripped of it utterly,
A man, O nature! face to face with thee,
It might be worth while then a man to be.

I have but raced through all the earth.
I clutched my pleasure by the hair;
What did not please I flung aside,
What slid from me I let it slide.
I have but craved, enjoyed and craved again,
Gone storming through my life amain:
Lusty I was and daring; I am now a sage.
I know this old round earth sufficiently;
What lies above the clouds no man can see.
Fool, who must thither turn his dazzled eyes
And dream of some great Comrade in the skies.
Let him stand fast and look about him here.
The world's his answer, if he can but hear.

and again, referring to the work he would like to see accomplished, a task for happy and laborious people:

Yes, now this thought shall have my whole allegiance,
This word high-throning wisdom knows for true:
That only he deserves his life, his freedom,
Who wins them every day anew.
Thus, compassed round with every danger here,
Boy, man and greybeard fill the gallant year.
That is the life and vigour I would see,
Standing with free men on a soil that's free:
Then to the passing moment I could say,
"Thou art so beautiful, wilt thou not stay?"
The centuries to come will keep the trace
Of what I have accomplished in my place;
Dreaming, I draw that far-off rapture near,
And win my highest moment now and here.

The last remarks, in which he bids the passing moment "stay awhile" are to be interpreted in connection with the original pact, and are obviously of an ambiguous nature. His "satiation" is a vision in the future, not a reality in the present, and this circumstance, according to many commentators, enables him to evade the bond. Whether this is a correct interpretation or not does not in any case concern us, and we can safely leave the problem to those whom it interests. What is more important for us are the active terms of Faust's summing up of life, the praise of work or activity, the rejection of magic, and, most important of all, the acceptance of the law of measure. Striving and craving are not enough, nor speculation about the infinite. Man must mind his own business and attend to the work in hand. We could, in point of fact, point to many works

of Goethe where the law is better expressed than it is here, but the meaning is sufficiently clear to be construed in this sense. Faust has seen in his youth the effect of "storming and craving" in the awful fate of Gretchen; he had nearly gone "too far" on the Brocken; and he had "overreached" himself last of all in the episode of Baucis and Philemon. This was enough to teach him the classical law, and if we are tempted to see nothing more than a negative value in it, we have always to remember that it stands for concentration rather than pure negation, the basis on which it works being one of unremitting activity.

Nor is this all. There is also the "mystery" which he had experienced in his student days, and which even now, in the twilight of a soberer life, has not evaporated. It would seem at first reading that the restrained philanthropist, the active humanitarian of these last scenes, with his gaze directed entirely on the work of this life, had forgotten the "mystery" of his youth and the God who manifested himself in the Earth-spirit. Yet this is not so, and to understand the full truth we must turn to the end. The *chorus mysticus*, lifting for a moment the veil, turns the action into the transcendental, and shows that the mystical unity felt by Faust in his youth is still at the centre and still felt by him.

The things that must pass
Are only symbols;
Here shall all failure
Grow to achievement,
Here the untellable
Work all fulfilment,
The woman in woman
Lead forward for ever.

(Alles Vergängliche
Ist nur ein Gleichnis:
Das unzulängliche
Hier wird's Ereignis
Das unbeschreibliche
Hier ist's getan;
Das Ewig-weibliche
Zieht uns hinan.)

And precisely because this mystic unity at the centre remains at the centre unchanged, the ascending steps of life from Auerbach's Keller to the colonizing scene at the end, from the Witches' Kitchen to the Helena, have a real "progressive" meaning, which is more than that of mere succession and change. The "living garment" woven by the deity, the folds of which are symbolic of Faust's endless activity, has taken on ever brighter lines, and in the brightening Faust has had a hand. So we begin to understand the meaning of the famous lines:

The soul that still has strength to strive
We have the strength to free,

where the emphasis is on the "effort," together with the equally important lines which follow:

And if the watching Love in heaven
Leans down to take his part,
The Sacred Band will welcome him
Home to the open heart.

where not the effort, but the "grace" which comes to meet it, is introduced to complete the circle. Goethe is not a mediævalist, and lays no emphasis on this "grace" but he knows it must exist, and finds a place for it.

For our life today there is much that is important in this poem and much that can give us satisfaction. The law of "activity," of hard work in the service of the community, is such a commonplace today that we need hardly stress it, observing only that it was in Faust's mouth prophetic of the twentieth century. Secondly, and this is perhaps not so well understood today, that hard work alone is not enough, that before the individual does good to others on the principles of humanitarianism, he must first do "good" to himself—the lesson learnt by Faust in the fate of Baucis and Philemon. The desire to do good, in brief, to uplift the human race, is a noble desire, but it must not take on the aspect of power unrestrained, the tyranny which equates "good" with its own ideals. And lastly, and this too is a point which will be well understood in these post-war days, Faust has seen a vision of a healthy, sane and harmonious earthly life in the Helena episode, which is precisely one of our own ideals, and which is an essential part of his own development. The peculiar combination of duty and pleasure which may be read in the lines—

Dasein ist Pflicht und wär's ein Augenblick,

spoken deliberately on the background of a healthy human life, are an excellent reminder of the dual end of life, the æsthetic and the moral, both of whom are necessary, in Goethe's opinion, on the way to the eternal itself.

Precisely the lack of a sense of the eternal constitutes the modern dilemma, and here, if anywhere, we can learn most from Faust. We also, like the early Faust, are hypochondriacal; we also are disillusioned by the hard facts; and if we do not turn to the magic Faust turned to, we are liable, in its place, to substitute a science almost as dangerous and hopes which are more illusory. It is not that our science and our hopes are necessarily wrong—all ages entertain them and they must needs arise—but that we have lost the sense of the mystery behind and the divine awareness which gave it depth. It is remarkable, for example, that the disillusionment of Faust and the "storming

and craving" of his earthly life did not blunt his perception of evil nor hand him over helpless to Mephistopheles on the heights of the Brocken; remarkable, too, that the ecstasy of Helen did not blunt it either, nor his triumph in the colony at the end. In the end he converted the fiend, not the fiend him, and he was able to do it because of his anchorage in the eternal. The "dunkler Drang" of his youth was cleared up into brightness because of this belief, the faith in the mystery that life and its handicaps could not deaden.

F. McEACHRAN.

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT*

THE "Way of Renewal" Leaflet No. 8, in the lines suggested for the corporate study of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, quite helpfully leads off with the practical part of the subject.† On the other hand, it is important to note that the expression "The Holy Spirit" would not have been used in the New Testament, in Christian doctrine, or in our twentieth-century Pastoral Theology but for its occurrence in the Old Testament in its Hebrew and Greek editions. Neither the doctrine of Plato of old, nor a review of life and facts to-day, would have brought this great subject, not to say the Third Person of the Eternal Trinity, into Christian creeds and theology. In some way the Old Testament is the fountain. None the less, how different is the conception of the Holy Spirit in the bulk of the Old Testament from that of the Holy Spirit in the New! So amazing is this development that a critically scientific study of the subject of "the Spirit of God in the Old Testament" leads some scholars (unnecessarily, we think) to the conclusion that, in the words of St. John vii. 39 (according to the text of \aleph and L) "The Spirit was not yet."

Accordingly, before we discuss pre-Christian conceptions, before we dissect, before we weigh (with perhaps disappointing results) the O.T. ideas, it is only fair for us to remind ourselves of the inexpressibly important and truly *vital* significance of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit which we Christians believe. Inasmuch as in days gone by the doctrine of, and the realization of the presence of, the Holy Spirit have been associated with more than one religious revival in portions of the Church, surely

* A paper read at the first of a series of discussions upon the Person and work of the Holy Spirit at combined sessions of the *Way of Renewal* and the C.S.S.S.

† *Schemes for Study and Prayer*, issued by the Archbishops' Advisory Committee (published by S.P.C.K.).

now, the very phrase "The Way of Renewal" should make us think of the Holy Ghost as the Giver and the Renewer of Life. We each remember the occasions in our personal history at which the *Veni Creator Spiritus* has been sung. God knows the earnestness with which we instruct our candidates for Confirmation to think at least as much of the Grace of the Holy Spirit (at all times to be sought and always to be relied upon) as of their own fresh eagerness to consecrate themselves to God. And we are conscious that what the world outside the Church needs is not only a superficial cheering-up such as it is in the power of the Church to administer, but God the Holy Spirit, who (notwithstanding Karl Barth, Calvin, Augustine and even St Paul) is no respecter of persons, but who is operating upon every human spirit, and can, if conditions are suitable, work as the Giver of spiritual life, the great Transformer of the desires and of the outward actions of mankind, and can be the Guide to their deep and eternal comfort. We are trying in our practical work to teach and to bring this comfort, and we perhaps ask ourselves whether in such days as these in which we live we have the right to discuss theory, lest we be judged as being fiddlers while Rome is burning.

The "Holy Spirit in the Old Testament"—the Spirit of Jehovah, God's Spirit. There is no recognition of the Person of the Holy Spirit from Genesis to Malachi (or, expressed somewhat more historically, from Amos to Daniel) any more than there is of the *Second* Person of the Trinity. Though the Hebrews (or many Hebrews) not seldom admitted gods other than Yahweh into their theology, they never conceived of God as in an sense existing in more than one permanent mode (*ὑπόστασις*). "The LORD our God is one LORD" (Deut. vi. 4) is the Hebrew Creed, and to this very day. It is true that in Isaiah's inaugural vision (related in chapter vi. of the book which bears his name) strange shining beings in the temple or in heaven adore God, using the word "Holy" *thrice* repeated. This does not shew that either they, or Isaiah, conceived of a Trinity in Unity. We may quote that able Roman Catholic scholar of the Old Testament, Albert Condamin, commenting on this passage: "We can not see here, properly speaking, a certain 'revelation' of this mystery; for the threefold repetition of a word is to be met with elsewhere in solemn affirmations, thus: 'Earth, earth, earth, hear the words of Jehovah,' Jeremiah xxii. 29." (And Condamin cites Ezekiel xxi. 27, "I will overturn, overturn, overturn it"—or, better, "an overthrow, overthrow, overthrow.") Similarly, in commenting on "Who will go for us?" in Isa. vi. 8, this same faithful Roman disagrees with a brother commentator who declares "It is not doubtful that the mystery of the Holy Trinity is, for the first time, designated under this form." Condamin

maintains that, on the contrary, it does seem to him "doubtful." He goes on: "Probably this expression represents here God in the society of His servants in the heavenly army, who in verse 3 are represented as celebrating His glory, and as interested in seeing the triumph of it over the earth." Condamin compares 1 Kings xxii. 19: "I saw the LORD sitting upon his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left." Condamin is here quoted merely because his Trinitarian orthodoxy is unimpeachable. And there are occasions when it seems clear that he swerves from his own critical judgment by reason of the weight which he feels bound to attach to Church tradition.*

We hardly need to remind ourselves of what the Early Christian Fathers supposed were direct references (or at least miraculously inspired allusions) in the Old Testament to the doctrine of the Trinity.

In Genesis i. the phrase "Let *us* make man in our image" was not, and never could have been, understood by a Hebrew of pre-Christian days, any more than it would be by one to-day, in the sense that there was a Trinity within the Unity. Personally, I am doubtful whether even a properly instructed Christian would deliberately speak of God as "They" or "Them."† The only record of any number of Jews recognizing three Gods is contained in the Elephantine Papyri,‡ where it is narrated as a matter of history that in an island of the Nile the Jews divided their money-offering between Yahu (Jehovah), Ashem-Bethel and 'Anath-Bethel! If there is no *a priori* reason for expecting to find in the O.T. a belief in the Trinity, we shall not be surprised if, as we trace the occurrences of such phrases as "Spirit of God," "Holy Spirit," we are never brought face to face with the doctrine that this spirit is a Person.

The Hebrew term translated "spirit" is, of course, רוּחַ, a word which primarily stands for, and to the end of the O.T. can bear the signification of, "wind." Its gender is often masculine, but feminine more frequently. Many of the feminine occurrences are in reference to the spirit of God. An anthropomorphic conception of God pervades the O.T. and comes to the surface in even its noblest passages. Jehovah is spoken of as possessing hands, arms, feet, a back, legs, face and mouth. I must not linger over the religious value of the conception of a Deity capable of feeling. Nor, on the other hand, need I refer to the importance of the prohibition of images of Jehovah in

* E.g., in his prophetic Messianic exposition of Isaiah liii. (*Le Livre d'Isaïe*, p. 330).

† The expression "with Them in highest heaven" (in the hymn "Now thank we all our God") is not consciously heretical.

‡ In Cowley's edition and in his English translation it is No. 22, ll. 123-125.

preventing a gross anthropomorphic conception from gaining the upper hand. In one noble passage is God contrasted with flesh; in Isaiah xxxi. 3, the Egyptians' horses are "flesh" and not (as Jehovah) "spirit." But from this Deity conceived of as in bodily form, comes a "wind," an invisible, intangible influence. Again and again in the O.T. God is pictured as acting upon nature or upon man by means of God's wind or spirit. The spirit may be (like the wind) something, as it were, external to Himself; indeed, He might be described as sending an evil spirit or *rûah* e.g. between Abimelech and the inhabitants of Shechem (Judg. ix. 23)—so that as a result the Shechemites "dealt treacherously" with Abimelech. (There is no Christian ethic in this passage.) So with Saul's fits of extreme depression; they were caused by "an evil spirit from God" (1 Samuel xviii. 10, etc.). Thus also the spirit (or wind) of, or sent by, Jehovah might carry Elijah away (1 Kings xviii. 12). And Zedekiah, the son of Chenaanah, derisively asks: "Which way went the spirit of the LORD from me to speak unto thee?" (1 Kings xxii. 24). On the other hand, many passages, at least in later history, are probably to be explained as referring to a spirit which Jehovah Himself possesses.

It is not necessary to the subject of this paper to examine how the O.T. views the human spirit in man. I mention in passing that man was conceived of as possessing a *soul* which kept him alive—his *nephesh*. A dead lad returns to life when his *nephesh* "comes back" (1 Kings xvii. 21, 22). In the late passage Eccles. xii. 7, at death "the spirit (*rûah*) returns to God who gave it." Some would identify *nephesh* and *rûah*, but *rûah* as applied to man as distinct from God is a post-exilic idea; and when this idea came in, the human *rûah* (speaking generally) was conceived of as possessing a higher spiritual power than the *nephesh* or breath-soul, which was concerned more exclusively with physical emotions. And it seems clear that in the minds of the Hebrews the investing of man with a "spirit" arose after they had become accustomed to the notion of God wielding or owning a "spirit."*

But to resume: the spirit from God (or the spirit of God) acted upon man, "coming upon" him, "stirring him up," "clothing itself" in him and especially "rushing upon" him.† The result varied with the occasion and with the type of person. Or, looked at from the converse point of view, almost anything that was extraordinary or outstanding, as well as what might be truly supernatural, could be attributed to the spirit of God.

* Cf. Principal Wheeler Robinsons, *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit*, especially pp. 13, 20, 122, 123.

† The Hebrew *šālah*, rendered in R.V. "to come mightily upon" (see Judg. xiv. 6, etc.). The same word is used in connection with fire in Amos v. 6.

(1) God's spirit made certain people exceptionally fine goldsmiths and woodcarvers; cf. Exod. xxxi. 3 (P) "and behold I have filled him [Bezalel] with the spirit of God."

(2) A national deliverer may be filled with enthusiasm, or carried off his feet with eagerness, for his patriotic task. In Hebrew, this is thought of as the spirit (again we must spell it with a small s) "coming upon" him; so with Othniel, Gideon, Jephthah and Samson. There is little of what we should term essentially "spiritual" here.

(3) Excitement—especially in connection with the religion of a people slowly emerging from beliefs and customs of primitive Asiatics—excitement, the lower religious ecstasy, is attributed to the spirit of God working upon man. In 1 Sam x. 10 a band of prophets coming down from the high place with psaltery and timbrel and harp, and "prophesying," the spirit of God came mightily upon Saul, "and he prophesied among them." Similarly, in the parallel passage 1 Sam xix. 18-24, when Saul as king sent messengers to take David, these saw a company of the prophets prophesying; and at last Saul himself came to these prophets and the spirit of God "came upon him also and he went on and prophesied," finally stripping himself of his clothes, "lying down naked all that day and all that night, wherefore [according to this second explanation] they say, Is Saul also among the prophets?" Of course, the Biblical writers are not bound to the view that ecstasy comes exclusively from God's *spirit*. For the ecstasy in which Isaiah at one time finds himself may be attributed not to the action of Jehovah's spirit, but to the grip of His "hand" (viii. 11, "The LORD spake thus unto me with a strong hand.")

(4) Perhaps it is a natural transition at this point to think of the spirit of Jehovah not in connection with the lower type of prophetic ecstasy, but with a more spiritual kind. Micah is "full of power by the spirit of the LORD" (Mic. iii. 8, cf. Hos. ix. 7). In Isa. xxx. 1 a party in Judæan politics is denounced because they do not "take counsel of Jehovah," and the "web" which they "weave" does not come from Jehovah's spirit, i.e. from prophecy in touch with God. Strangely, Jeremiah does not speak of the action of Jehovah's spirit in connection with true prophecy. It is left to the priestly Ezekiel to emphasize this. The second Isaiah appears to affirm that Jehovah has sent him with His spirit (Isa. xlviii. 16). The post-exilic Isaiah utters his words of hope "because the spirit of the LORD Jehovah is upon" him (Isa. lxi. 1 ff.). (We remind ourselves that Rabbinical Judaism developed the connection between prophecy and the spirit of God. For example, Isa. xi. 2 is interpreted in the Targum, "the spirit of *prophecy*

from before Jehovah shall rest upon him." According to the New Testament all prophets were under the influence of the Spirit (1 St. Pet. i. 10, 11; 2 St. Pet. i. 21). The "sin against the Holy Spirit" is, apparently, refusing to hear God's voice spoken through Jesus the great Prophet.)

(5) In Isa. xi. 2, a coming king is spoken of as to receive the spirit of Jehovah resting upon him, giving him six- or seven-fold equipment.

(6) We come at last to the interesting passages which bring the spirit of God into contact, not merely with outstanding characters such as artificers, patriotic warriors and prophets, but with a nation generally, and with members thereof individually. This aspect of the subject can conveniently be examined by brief reference to the texts themselves.

(a) Isaiah, in the oracle of Hezekiah's reign against "the women that are at ease" (xxxii. 9), speaks of the troubles ahead "until the spirit [R.V. rightly prints a small *s*]—obviously Jehovah's spirit,—be poured upon *us* from on high," providing both material* prosperity and ethical religion.

(b) Ezekiel xxxvi. 26, 27 is important. The prophet does not mention Jehovah's spirit as acting upon Israel to renew it; but he speaks of the possibility of a "new heart" and "new spirit" being given to them in exchange for what they at present have, and he also says that Jehovah will put His spirit *within* the nation. Similarly in xxxvii. 14, we read: "I will put my spirit within you and ye shall live"—i.e., Judah will not as a people be extinguished in Babylon. It is noteworthy that this association of the spirit with *life* is to be met with elsewhere—e.g., in Ps. civ. 30, "Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the ground." But in the O.T. in this connection the life is only *physical* life.

(c) The Isaiah whose work must be placed *after* the first period of the Return (to whom reference was made above), whilst not speaking of a presence or power of God's spirit with or upon his hearers, may by inference be presumed to have held that such was a possibility for the nation Israel. For he reads back into the primitive history of his people the presence of the spirit of God. The great prophet puts into the mouth of his contemporaries words of penitence (Isa. lxiii. 11-14): "Then they [Israel, not as the Massoretic Text *he*, "God"] recalled the days of old, Moses and His people, saying, Where is He that brought up from the sea the shepherd of His flock [Moses]? Where is He that put His holy spirit within them [Israel], that led

* The work of God's Spirit in nature is referred to at least once elsewhere. In the Priestly account of the Creation (Gen. 1. 2) this Spirit, this life-giving Force, "broods" as a bird over the chaos even before God utters His word and fiat.

them by the right hand of Moses? . . . The spirit of Jehovah caused them to rest" [*i.e.*, to settle in Canaan]. Here we have the spirit of Jehovah at the Exodus period *within* Israel. At the same time, indeed, the writer, two verses previously, pictures the spirit also as something *apart*—parallel to Jehovah's "angel" (whatsoever significance we to-day are to attach to the conception)—"The angel of his presence saved them" (ver. 9) . . . "But they rebelled, and vexed his holy spirit" (ver. 10).

Perhaps this is the most satisfactory point at which to examine the expression "his holy spirit," occurring twice in this context, but elsewhere in the O.T. only in the familiar clause "take not thy holy spirit from me" of Ps. li. It is difficult to agree with those commentators who believe that we are here brought face to face with a personification or *hypostasization*. "His holy spirit" Israel "vexes" (Isa. lxiii. 10). Against it they rebel. They grieve or pain it. And so a Hebrew might distrust Yahweh's *arm* and despise his affectionate yearnings. The point seems to be that the leading of Jehovah's angel or of the *shekhinah* in the wilderness Israel refused. God's spirit is not an entity or personality, but at the most the means whereby the presence of a personal God is diffused. In the passage Isa. xxxii. 15 (referred to above), "until the spirit be poured upon us from on high," there is no article to *ruah* and the LXX rendering is simply *πνεῦμα*; in any case, the spirit appears to be not a personification, but the life-giving principle from Jehovah.

(d) Psalm li. must now be examined. Here an individual (for there are grave difficulties in taking this Psalm as referring to Israel as a nation) prays to God: "Renew a right spirit within me (ver. 10b). . . . Uphold me with a free spirit" [or willing or princely spirit (ver. 12b)]. These references are, of course, only to the person's own spirit; the "right spirit" is parallel with "the clean heart" of ver. 10a. However, the phrase "Take not thy holy spirit from me" (in ver. 11b) implies that the influence emanating from the holy God (which according to Isa. lxiii. Israel as a people once "vexed" or "grieved") can be conceived of as exerting an influence upon an ordinary Israelite, if the conditions on the man's side do not render this impossible. Israel the nation might have Jehovah's holy spirit "in" (or expressed more clearly "in the midst of") them; the individual Israelite, so Psalm li. *perhaps* implies, could have the same "within" him. Where precisely, the Psalmist does not define.* *Probably* all that Psalm li. 11 means is, "do not withdraw [or cut off] Thy radiating influence from working upon me" [perhaps especially Thy guidance]. The teaching of the Psalm (omitting the con-

* There seems to be no O.T. writer who advanced to the point that man's spirit is the centre of operation for God's spirit. Even St Paul is content to state that Christian men's bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit who dwelleth in them.

tradictory appendix about sacrifices) is a noble achievement of the O.T. Its religious ideas surely render the composition of the passage out of the question before the age of Jeremiah.

(e) Briggs assigns the Psalm to the period of Nehemiah—an assignment which would commend itself to few. This fact, however, may be used here to serve as an introduction to a reference, in Neh. ix. 20, to God's "good spirit." "Thou gavest also thy good spirit to instruct them" [Israel in the desert]—as well as the pillar of fire, etc., to shew them the way wherein they should go (ix. 19b). The spirit is good because God is good. His spirit exercised a beneficent influence. So it is said in one of the latest Psalms (cxliii. 10), "Thy spirit is good: lead me in the land of uprightness"; or, perhaps, "Let thy good spirit lead me in the land of uprightness." In the N.T. the epithet "good" is not applied to the Spirit, though in both the Johannine and Pauline descriptions one of the Spirit's functions is in some spiritual sense to guide or "lead."

We have already reminded ourselves that the passages of the O.T., which at one time were held to refer to a Blessed Trinity within the Unity, must be subjected to an interpretation consistent with the monotheism which was a cardinal point in Israel's highest religion. In Isa. lxiii., the spirit of God is "holy"; of course it is, and so elsewhere is Jehovah's "arm" ("his holy arm"), for God is "holy." But as Isa. lxiii. represents one of the mountain-tops of O.T. religion, it must be noted that the reference is not to the holiness of a god "separated" by his majesty from the ordinary Israelite. God's spirit is "holy" because He is ethically pure, and accordingly the influence emanating from Him is, from the nature of things, "holy."

(b) Nor does the use of the possessive "His," or in Psalm li. 11 "Thy," in connection with this holy spirit, prove any hypostatization—the very reverse. The spirit belongs to Him; it is a thing, an influence, which (not whom) He sends.

The vocabulary for the N.T., as nearly as possible,* has now been arrived at: "Thy" [or "His,"] "holy spirit," and "[the] spirit." But how very little is to be learnt from the entire O.T. of the helpfulness in the Christian sense of this "spirit." A glance at Romans viii. or Galatians v. or St. John xiv.-xvi. shews this. The O.T. has little that is definite and little detail. Even the Joel prophecy itself does not get us past new prophecies and new visions and the world being destroyed.

Two lines are possible. (1) *Theoretically*, if in O.T. theology

* The Pseudepigraphic literature adds surprisingly little, except that *Psalms of Solomon* xvii. 42 seems to offer the first occurrence of the expression, so common in the N.T., πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Rabbinical Hebrew also developed this phrase, at any rate by the end of the second century A.D., cf. (e.g.) *Aboda Zara* 20 b.

there was no Person of the Holy Spirit but only an influence, this may correspond to the real facts of the case. St Paul and St John invented from phrases current from O.T. times a Divine Person, and invested Him with a wealth of glorious attributes. (2) On the other hand, a critical examination of the relevant passages of the O.T. need lead us to no concession greater than this: the activity attributed in the O.T. to the spirit of God, provided it does not offend our consciences as Christians,* may be taken as indeed the action of the Third Person of the Eternal Trinity in Unity; the Personality, not to say the Deity, of the Spirit was not known to the writer, the prophet, or the person acted upon, but only to the Eternal God Himself. If this second alternative is correct, to Christians the results of impartial investigation of the O.T. are not really disappointing, for, through the O.T. the Spirit terminology had been formulated, ideas had been classified, and in the fullness of time the Spirit whom men in ignorance had been groping after, Him the New Testament religion declared.

R. S. CRIPPS.

* Cf. what is written on page 276 upon 1 Sam. x. and xix.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

DR. BRIGHTMAN'S death robs the Church of England of a scholar of profound learning and world-wide reputation. Whether in his monumental works on the Liturgies, or in briefer works of criticism (such as his article on the Revised Prayer Book in the *Church Quarterly Review* a few years ago), he brought to the life of the Church a contribution of unique value. And his knowledge was varied and to the point. He came to Winchester last year to arrange for some work which his College was to undertake in the Waynflete chantry, and pointed out at once an error made in the colouring of part of the Bishop's effigy at the last restoration. A few minutes later he was looking at three little figures at the foot of Wykeham's effigy, commonly supposed to be monks. "No, they are not monks," he said. "They are Bachelors." "Bachelors?" we replied. "Yes, Bachelors of Arts. Two are Bachelors, and one is a Master." He had spotted that the robes they wore were not monastic, but academic.

We have received a notice of a forthcoming "Anglican Anthology" of "Anglo-ecclesiastical" literature of the seventeenth century, which is being prepared in America under the editorship of Dr. Paul Elmer More and Mr. F. L. Cross, with the help of a strong Committee of American Churchmen. It is hoped to have the work, which will consist of two large volumes, ready for publication by 1933, the centennial year of the Oxford Movement. We foresee a very useful book.

The York Quarterly contains a brief, but vigorous, editorial article on "The Ethics of Gambling," urging that gambling is wrong in principle. "The principle quite plainly is a distribution of wealth on a basis of chance, and that is indefensible." We cannot help asking why. The distribution of wealth on this basis may not be ideal; but so long as soil, climate, and weather vary as they do, we do not see how it is avoidable. Would not Dr. Temple's assertion mean in the long run that no business man was entitled to take risks? However, we will not pursue this now: for it is clear that the issue will shortly become one of urgent legislative importance, and practical decisions will have to be taken. There will be general agreement among thoughtful people as to the grave effects which the gambling habit now has in society, and every desire to mitigate them. The Bill, recently brought before the House of Commons, made no attempt whatever to do this; and we are exceedingly glad that the Government has decided to refer the whole matter to a Royal Commission, so that the practical evils of gambling may be fairly faced, and legislation devised which will really deal with them.

NOTES

THE GIFT OF TONGUES IN ACTS II.

IN the May issue of "Theology" there appeared an article on this subject in which two suggestions were made.

(1) That those who heard the Apostolic message were not as has usually been supposed pilgrims who had come to Jerusalem for the Feast, but

permanent residents (κατοικοῦντες). (This may very likely be true, but in view of ver. 9 we cannot press κατοικοῦντες in this connection.)

(2) That what so impressed them was the hearing once again of their mother-tongue—the language of their childhood (ἐν ᾗ ἐγενήθημεν). The difficulty of reconciling the account of the Tongues in Acts ii. and 1 Cor. xiv. is well-known. If we take St. Paul's account, it is fairly clear that the tongues were some kind of ecstatic utterance, dictated rather by the emotions (πνεῦμα) than by the intellect (νοῦς) of the speaker, and unintelligible unless interpreted. As it has usually been understood, Acts ii. suggests that the gift of tongues had the opposite effect of making intelligible what would not otherwise have been so.

Now St. Paul speaks in 1 Cor. xiv. of two separate gifts—speaking with tongues and interpreting tongues. I would suggest that what happened at Pentecost was that the Apostles received a gift of γλωσσολαλία similar to the Corinthian gift and the hearers on this unique occasion a corresponding gift of interpretation, which caused them to understand the Apostolic utterance as an utterance in their mother-tongue, with the spiritual effect (cf. 1 Cor. xiv, 24, 25) described by the writer of the article. If we make this further supposition we remove the discrepancy between Acts ii. and St. Paul.

It is true that Acts ii. taken by itself would scarcely support this explanation. But if we remember that the writer was not in this case an eye-witness, the vagueness of his account is very likely due to the fact that he was not very clear in his own mind as to what exactly took place at Pentecost.

R. J. MORRICE.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Zeitschrift für die N.T.liche Wissenschaft. 1931. Heft 3/4.

A remarkable double number. Pride of place is given to the controversy regarding the Sanhedrin's power of inflicting death, provoked by Prof. Lietzmann's paper *Der Prozess Jesu* (1931), which gave an affirmative answer. M. DIBELIUS studies Lietzmann's analysis of Mark's Passion-story which traces the testimony of eyewitnesses back to the young man who fled away naked and to Simon of Cyrene, but not to Peter. Dibelius holds that Mark used an earlier written narrative, which included the passages which are at variance with Mark's main story, put the Crucifixion before the Passover (as in John), used eyewitnesses' reports for the arrest and the *Via dolorosa*, and incorporated Old Testament prophecies to prove that the features which were most likely to cause offence, such as the flight of the disciples and the tortures of the Crucifixion, were in accord with God's will. F. BUCHSEL follows with an acute essay on the Sanhedrin's power of death. Nowhere in the Empire was such power given to subordinate local authorities. Josephus says expressly that the Sanhedrin had power to put to death those who profaned the Temple; but this was a special concession (Titus says ἐπετρέψαμεν). The Jews may have claimed that Stephen's threat to the Temple (Acts vi. 13) was covered by the concession, and the Romans may have acquiesced. The point was one about which the Jews felt strongly, since the Old Testament prescribed the death penalty in certain cases and not to inflict it dishonoured God. H. LIETZMANN has a first instalment of a reply.

H. WINDISCH writes an illuminating essay on John i. 51, the angels ascending and descending on the Son of Man. This is interpreted as a piece of eschatology unique in the Fourth Gospel, connected with the Son of Man accompanied by the angels as described in Daniel and referred to by our Lord at His trial.

CARL SCHMIDT gives a full description of the papyri Bible MSS. lately found in Egypt. They were offered to him in the first instance, but were beyond his purse. Their origin is unknown and probably will remain unknown; the vendors are shrouded in mystery, for they are afraid of coming up against the Government. Probably the Gospels Codex was used in a monastery until it was worn out, and then buried out of reverence. Other fragments may be offered for sale in the future. The extreme importance of the finds may be gauged by the following facts. Septuagint texts are now available dating from a period earlier than Origen's Hexapla. The Gospels and Acts, we now know, were in Codex form in the third century, a period when, so it has been hitherto assumed, they were found only in separate rolls. Apparently, though this is not yet certain, the Pastoral Epistles were not in the Pauline Canon. Perhaps the most striking textual gain is the large sections of the original Septuagint of Daniel, superseded in the second century by Theodotion's version, hitherto known only from one MS. of the eleventh century. As our readers are probably aware, the N.T. text is neither "Westcott and Hort" (neutral) nor Western, but has affinities with the Cæsarean text.

W. K. L. C.

REVIEWS

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF MODERN SCIENCE. C. E. M. Joad.
Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES. F. R. Tennant. Cambridge,
6s.

For the last year I have been hard at work on a book on precisely the same subject as Mr. Joad's. I have therefore read him with intense interest and curiosity. I hope I may say without presumption that it is a very good book; and though he describes himself as a pluralistic realist, while I am a disciple of the Platonists, and even, with reservations, of the Thomists, I find in it a powerful support of some of the views which I am trying to defend.

My heart warmed to Mr. Joad when I found him owning that he could not understand Whitehead. I have torn my hair for weeks over Whitehead's books, and like Mr. Joad was finally "baffled" by *Process and Reality*. I had been wondering whether I should dare to confess exactly what Mr. Joad has confessed about himself.

Our great astronomers, Jeans and Eddington, in attempting to reconcile science and metaphysics, and to interpret both to the general reader, have fared like Mr. Pickwick when he intervened between Slurk and Pott. The severer scientists blame them for popularizing discoveries which the vulgar herd should be content to accept on authority, and the metaphysical pundits have rapped their knuckles for making confused arguments and rash adventures on unfamiliar ground. But it is not worth while to prove that these distinguished mathematicians are amateurs in philosophy. The question is whether the idealism which they think themselves driven to profess is consistent with the foundations of their scientific labours. I agree with Mr. Joad that it is not.

The mechanicism of the last century, against which theologians protested rightly though not always very intelligently, is now discredited. It rested on two assumptions—that the real must be something visible and tangible, and that it must work like a machine. The entities with which the new physical science ends are so unlike anything which naïve realism imagines to exist that materialism is out of court. If there is no matter, how can one be a materialist? But alas, it is easy enough; we do not disprove materialism by calling matter something else. Besides, our astronomers are mathematicians,

not mechanicians; and concrete fact, especially irreducible given fact which cannot be rationalized, is a nuisance in mathematics. They want to be rid of it.

And so we find Eddington and Jeans taking refuge in Berkeleyan idealism, or pure mentalism. "Physicists," says Eddington, "have chased the solid substance from the continuous liquid to the atom, from the atom to the electron, and *there they have lost it.*" Nothing remains but "pointer-readings." "The universe," says Jeans, "begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine." The physical world is completely interpretable in terms of mathematical concepts, and is therefore the creation of a mathematical mind. He will go a step further, and say that the world is only a thought in the mind of a mathematician.

To this Mr. Joad objects that the world is *not* exhaustively analysable in terms of mathematics. Other aspects, such as the intrinsic values, which are *given* no less than sense-perceptions, have been ignored to start with. Also, because the universe can be described in terms of mathematics, it does not follow that the universe is mathematics. But the former assertion—that the universe can be exhaustively analysed in terms of mathematics, is more important, and is demonstrably untrue. Biology and psychology protest vehemently. Meyerson, whom Mr. Joad seems not to have read, lays great stress on entropy—an irreversible, unilinear movement, as making a big hole in a mathematical universe. The beginning of the world, however we imagine it to have begun, is another intractable surd, which we have to accept as an irreducible fact. The Platonists acknowledged this element of brute fact in the nature of things by speaking of "necessity," or saying, with Plotinus, *ἐδει*, "it just had to be." (I cannot imagine why Mr. Joad, on p. 78, speaks of *τὸ μὴ ὄν* in this connection.)

Besides these objections, I should maintain, with Meyerson, that you cannot begin with commonsense realism—with some object, say a drop of water, assumed to be real, and end with pure mentalism. You may peel the onion till there is very little left—only radiation perhaps; but to use the word "annihilation," as Jeans and Eddington do, is quite illegitimate. Radiation, however tenuous and imponderable, is still something. First of all, the dog wags his tail. Then the tail wags the dog. Then the dog is removed. Then the tail. Only the wag is left. The last step is illegitimate. From a concrete object to a purely mental concept there is no road.

Mr. Joad disposes of Bergson and the time-philosophers satisfactorily in one sentence. "The conclusion that living process is only change carries with it the corollary that there is

nothing which changes." But I was very much disappointed to find this great question, about the reality of time, dealt with so slightly. To me it is the crux of the whole problem. A considerable part of my book will be taken up with a polemic against the Time-philosophy, and I hoped to get much help from Mr. Joad. But he does not even mention Alexander, with his "reality as Space-Time," and his God as the tomorrow that never comes. Perhaps it was the better part of valour to avoid this, the most difficult problem in metaphysics; but Mr. Joad is not wanting in courage, and it bulks large among the "philosophical aspects of modern science."

The omission is partly made good by an admirable discussion on values, in which the objectivity of intrinsic value is cogently maintained. The concluding chapters on mysticism are also excellent. He does full justice to the evidential importance of the mystical vision, which belongs to reality, not dreamland; and at the same time states clearly the reason why the communion of the mystic and his God must stop short of the complete absorption for which some, especially in the East, have craved. "To admit the possibility of fusion between the finite and the infinite is in fact to annihilate the finite."

I find it a little difficult to reconcile his sympathetic attitude towards mysticism with the rather crude realism which sometimes emerges in this book. For example, on p. 249, "the features of significance which we discern in things are in no sense dependent upon the mind that perceives them." And on p. 316, "the only logical alternative to annihilation of the individual soul is to maintain its complete otherness from that which it contemplates." This is not the philosophy on which mysticism, as a quest of ultimate truth, is based. Rather, as I hold, we should say that reality is the unity in duality of the beholding Spirit and the spiritual world which it contemplates. Not complete otherness, but complete conquest, not of distinctness, but of separation, is what the mystic aims at, and the knowing mind expands *pari passu* with what it comes to know. At what stage, we may ask Mr. Joad, does the mind see things as they are? When it is quite outside them, or when it has made them, as it were, part of itself? That we can only know what we love, and only love what we are, is the fundamental presupposition of the mystic's way.

In my own book I have been led to regard two questions as crucial. (1) Is ultimate reality, the eternal world, timeless as well as spaceless? (2) Is God organic with the world? If the former question is answered in the negative, modern science interposes many obstacles to a philosophy of theism. Similarly, if the latter question is answered in the affirmative, and if

entropy is true, God, like the creation, is doomed to "annihilation"; and a God on his way to execution is no God. Mr. Joad avoids theology, but even if we do not call the Absolute "God," these two questions must be faced, for they determine our whole attitude towards the universe in space and time.

Dr. Tennant's book is a stiff treatise on epistemology, in which the salient point is an uncompromising *Historismus*, worthy of Croce, for whom God in history becomes God *as* history. It is not quite what the title of the lectures led me to expect, but I infer that Dr. Tennant has an eye on historical dogmas, the uniqueness of which he wishes to maintain without derogating from their importance, while at the same time he wants a solid chunk of "irrational," irreducible fact to throw at the mathematicians. I had expected so much from the book, which I did not find there, that I put it down in a mood of irritation, repeating to myself Faust's warning to Wagner that he will find nothing in history except the prejudices of historians; Sir Robert Walpole's words to his sick-nurse, "Read me anything you like except history—I know that can't be true"; Napoleon's definition of history as "une fable convenue"; Samuel Butler's gibe, "The Deity cannot alter the past, but historians can and do—perhaps that is why He allows them to exist"; Tennyson's, "Nothing worth proving can be proven, nor yet disproven"; and Bosanquet's deliberate judgment that history is incapable of any high degree of truth or value. There are many other surds in nature to upset a pan-mathematical universe. The value of history is only one part of the larger question about the ultimate reality of the time-process.

W. R. INGE.

ESSAYS IN ORDER. Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7. Sheed and Ward.
2s. 6d. each

The Bow in the Clouds. By E. I. Watkin.

The Necessity of Politics. By Carl Schmitt, with an Introduction by Christopher Dawson.

The Russian Revolution. By Nicholas Berdyaev. Translated with an Introduction by D. B.

The Drift of Democracy. By Michael de la Bedoyère.

In *The Bow in the Clouds* the author sets down "under the imaginative symbolism of the spectrum" what he claims "to be objective contacts with reality at its various levels." Ultra-violet—matter; violet—the positive sciences; indigo—technology, ethics, sociology, and history; blue—metaphysics; green—life; yellow—art; orange—sex; red—religion; ultra-red—mysticism. The symbolism is admittedly arbitrary, and

Mr. Watkin's treatment will appeal differently to different minds. It is a bold undertaking to attempt to cover the whole range of human knowledge in 150 pages. Nevertheless, this little volume is packed with thought and is in no way superficial. It is often suggestive, sometimes, perhaps, a little difficult, but always, as befits a philosopher, "synoptic." It is, however, the kind of book which is the despair of the reviewer who must be brief. All that can be said here is that we do not think that anybody who buys it and reads it will regret for a single moment that he has done so, and that is perhaps more than can be said for the majority of books. But it will naturally yield up more to those who have more knowledge than to those who have less.

The essay by Dr. Schmitt, who is Professor of Political theory in the University of Berlin, is entitled, *The Necessity of Politics*. He sets out to show that politics necessarily involves the principle of representation in some form and, consequently, stands in irreconcilable opposition to any purely economic order. Industrialism, on the other hand, requires for its existence nothing more than administrative employees to carry out its dictates. A complete industrializing of life is, however, impossible, for "Ideas" necessarily creep in, and these transcend the purely economic sphere, for they depend upon persons; and persons have as their necessary corollary the need of representation in some form. The Church, therefore, which represents the Person of Christ cannot come to terms with any scheme of things which does not recognize the principle of representation justly. "The ancient alliance between the Throne and the Altar will not be succeeded by an alliance between the Office and the Altar or the Factory and the Altar."

The present-day antagonism between the Church (sc. the Roman Church) and "Socialism" is due to this fundamental antithesis. Only "when the sanctuary lamps burning before our Catholic altars are supplied by the same power-stations as furnish the current for the local theatres and dance halls" will Catholicism have become intelligible to the purely economic mentality.

There is much that is stimulating in Professor Schmitt's thesis, although he surely exaggerates the gulf fixed between the Catholic ideal and the modern ideal of the economic state. Nor does he succeed in showing how Papal Infallibility and Temporal Power are integral to the *complexio oppositorum* which he rightly sees in Catholicism. It does not meet the case to speak simply of "the anti-Roman complex" and leave the matter there.

Unquestionably, *The Russian Revolution* is the most important of the books which have so far appeared in this series.

The author, Nicholas Berdyaev, who is not a Roman Catholic but an Orthodox, was at one time Professor of Philosophy in the University of Moscow; but, after a brief tenure of this position, he was exiled from Russia in 1922. In this little book he gives a brilliant exposition of the psychology of the Russian mind in general and of Bolshevism in particular.

Broadly speaking, it is possible to adopt one of three perverse attitudes to life: intellectualist, moralist, and religious. The first makes the dispassionate pursuit of knowledge and experience, as such, the chief aim and object of life. This ideal never seems to have had much attraction for the Russian mind. For instance, even to-day in Russia Einstein and Planck are nothing accounted of; they are disparagingly labelled as representatives of "*bourgeois science*." The perverted moralist attitude to life, however, is well represented in Nihilism which, in M. Berdyaev's words, "rejects morality for moral reasons." That is always the final result of a morality which is anti-religious. The Russian mind, revolting at the pain and suffering it witnessed all around it, led its possessors by "a godless asceticism" to bonds and to death so as to bring in a new order. All intellectual and religious values were spurned for this end.

The perverted religious attitude to life is uniquely reflected in Communism, which cannot be better described than as "religious atheism." Professor Berdyaev points out that the idea of Communism, as such, is religious in origin. Is not the very word linked with the name for the holiest Christian rite, Communion? It is the passionate desire, at bottom religious, to achieve this ideal of fellowship which is the real driving force behind the Russian Revolution. It is emphatically not the scientific, rational elements of Marxism which inspire the movement. These are expressed far more literally in German Social Democracy, which manifests few revolutionary tendencies. It is the fire of the religious instinct itself which, by a contradiction not strange to psychologists, is revealed in the violence of Communistic anti-religious propaganda. M. Berdyaev is surely right when he says, "If the Communists succeeded, by anti-religious propaganda, in finally tearing from the heart of man all religious feeling, faith, and readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of faith, they would make faith in Communism impossible too." He goes on to point out how even Marx's economic determinism, which is uninspiring enough as a creed, is shot through with a "Messianic Faith" for the future, when the Dictatorship of the Proletariat shall have had its perfect work.

It is precisely this apocalyptic element in Marxism which has given it its hold upon the Russian mind, which seems to be possessed of an "eschatological feeling as a spiritual disposition

independent of religious faith." The proletariat is "a messianic class; its vocation is to be the liberator of all mankind." Thus, according to M. Berdyaev, did the repressed Messianism of the regénade Jew, Karl Marx, find an outlet. Proletarian Communism is nothing but "a secularized form of the ancient Jewish chiliasm. A Chosen Class takes the place of the Chosen People. It was impossible to reach such a notion by means of science. It is an idea of a religious kind. Here we have the very marrow of the Communist religion."

Religion, as Professor Whitehead has said, is not necessarily a good thing; it may be very evil. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. This is pre-eminently true of the atheistic religion of Communism which, unlike the religions of obsolete Positivism and present-day Humanism, has denied both God *and* man, and set upon the throne Communistic society; in a word it is "social idolatry"—Philip drunk worshipping not Philip sober but a community of Philips, drunk with the thought of economic efficiency. "The Five Years Plan . . . is experienced as a religious emotion."

It is hard to resist the temptation to go on quoting from this fascinating book, which everybody should read. One more quotation must suffice: "If there is not a Christian revival in the world, a rebirth not only among the *élite*, but also among the great masses of the people, atheistic Communism will conquer the whole earth." That conclusion would be endorsed by many of those best qualified to judge, but there does not seem to be much evidence that the Church has begun to realize it.

Scarcely less interesting is M. de la Bedoyère's essay, *The Drift of Democracy*. His thesis can be stated simply. The humanistic ideal, which lies at the roots of the claims of democracy, cannot be sustained for long apart from the recognition of the supernatural, for the simple reason that the dignity of man is grounded in one fact and one fact alone, that he is made in the image of God. Otherwise he is nothing more than a clever animal. The trouble with modern democracy is that it is "scorning the base degrees by which it did ascend" in abandoning the theocratic tradition in which it was given birth. Unless that tradition can be preserved, nothing can save democracy from disaster, since it inevitably, and *ex hypothesi* "is absolutely dependent upon the character, the ideals, and the values of the ordinary man." M. de la Bedoyère, as a Roman Catholic, naturally looks to his own form of religion as the mainstay of religious ideals in the modern world. But he sees clearly, as apparently comparatively few of his brethren do, that, despite its growing numbers, the Roman Church counts for very little in the intellectual life of to-day. "It is a thing

intellectually though not socially apart." Perhaps the most vital of all modern questions is this, Can the Roman Church ever mediate a liberal Catholicism without ceasing to be recognizably the same?

L. DEWAR.

A SHORT HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC WORSHIP. By Percy Dearmer, D.D. Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d.

This interesting little book comes out with a great weight of authority. The author is widely known by his *Parson's Handbook*, now in its tenth edition. The book is commended for study by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York. It is "written at the request of and in collaboration with the Worship and Order Group," whose names are printed at the beginning. Perhaps we may describe it as a *Parson's Handbook* simplified and abridged for Moderate and Evangelical Churches. As such it will have a wide influence and do much good. Real progress has been made when men like the Bishop of Croydon, the Deans of Bristol and Exeter, Archdeacon Hunkin, Canons Cunningham and Ollard, and Mr. C. Cheshire, are in agreement as to principles, and even details, of worship.

It is ungracious to quarrel with so sensible and good a book, but it may be noted that the section on hymns is largely devoted to maintaining the superiority of *Songs of Praise* to its competitors, and that only one book of Carols, the Oxford Book, is mentioned. Both books are edited by Canon Dearmer. Naturally and genuinely he believes in their excellence, but there is something to be said for the older tradition of reticence in these matters. Again, the one concrete piece of advice on the choice of music is: Write to the Oxford University Press (the publisher of the book). Doubtless the advice will be admirable and disinterested, but it is better not to mix up idealism with what might be construed as a clever commercial policy on the part of the publisher.

May a reviewer be so old-fashioned as to state a case for *Hymns Ancient and Modern*? For himself he prefers the newer books, in spite of the eccentricities of *Songs of Praise*, which excludes Invocation of Saints, but not Invocation of Mice (No. 305, "The mouse, the coney, hear our prayer"). But does *Songs of Praise* meet the needs of 1932 as successfully as A. and M. met those of 1882? Is not its prevailing tone one of jolliness and optimism, which to the next generation will seem inadequate as surely as the Victorian hymnbooks to Dr. Dearmer are redolent of "second-rate gloom"? Does this tone really represent the best theological thought of to-day, and do justice to the apocalyptic interpretations of Christianity which

are gaining at the expense of the humanitarian? A more fundamental question—Should not a hymnbook follow the Psalter in providing for all moods, especially as it is the only manual of devotional poetry for sickness or health, in the average home? “Weary of earth and laden with my sin” is the hardest of Victorian hymns to defend. But I know a man who for fourteen years has habitually used it in preparing for confession.

Then as regards music. We may be reasonably certain that by 1982 many of the melodious Victorian tunes will have come back into favour. They will be deemed genuine “folk-music,” representing the heart of the people as truly as the innocent prettiness of a Gilbert and Sullivan opera represents something we in our sophistication have lost; and certainly as truly English as the recovered folksongs. And the leaders of musical opinion will be severely criticizing the self-confidence of the 1932 reformers. Would not a little more modesty in regard to our own achievements, and a little more piety in regard to those of our Victorian forefathers, be fitting? I am as bored with Victorian music and imitation Gothic architecture as Dr. Dearmer is, but I am not so sure that we are right in our prejudices. After all, the despised Victorians had full churches and a continually expanding Church life: we have half empty churches (which, *pace* Dr. Dearmer,* are not filled by the introduction of a new hymn book), and are with difficulty holding our own. I cannot be sure what verdict posterity will pass on the two ages.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

A SIMPLE METHOD OF RAISING THE SOUL TO CONTEMPLATION
IN THE FORM OF A DIALOGUE BY FRANÇOIS MALAVAL, 1627-
1719. Translated by Lucy Menzies, with an Introduction
by Evelyn Underhill. J. M. Dent and Sons. 7s. 6d.

François Malaval was a native of Marseilles, in which town he spent his whole life. He became blind at the age of nine months, in spite of which disability he was a man of considerable learning and holiness, who trained a large number of people both intellectually and spiritually, though he was, of course, not a priest.

The first treatise of which this book was composed was written in 1664, and had a considerable vogue, which led to the writing of the complementary second treatise in 1669, the whole book being published with a dedication to Cardinal Bona

* “A thrilling future of renewal is before those parishes that swim into the new era with the hymns of today, manly, stirring, Christian” (p. 4). But our spiritual *malaise* will not be cured by community singing—it cost more to redeem their souls.

and the *imprimatur* of the Doctors of the Faculty of Theology of Paris.

The book was widely read and greatly valued, no less by such authorities as Bona and Guilleré than by Molinos and Madame Guyon and their followers. Unfortunately for Malaval the next fifteen years saw the publication and condemnation of the *Spiritual Guide* and *Moyen Court*, and in 1687 his own work was condemned.

It is hardly surprising that the mischievous vagaries of Molinos and Madame Guyon should have caused a reaction against all ways of prayer which seemed to bear any resemblance to Quietism, whether they were actually Quietist or not, and so we find Malaval pilloried along with them in the *Instruction sur les Etats d'Oraison* of Bossuet. One suspects that the Bishop of Meaux's real grievance against Malaval was rather that he was a layman than a heretic, and the Bishop certainly had cause for irritation at the flattery of her Director, which Malaval puts in the mouth of his "Philothea" (herself borrowed from St. Francis de Sales), and his assumption of the title Father, whereby he attributed to himself an official authority which he did not, in fact, possess. However that may be, the book was destroyed, and only one copy is now known to exist, from which the present translation has been made.

This book contains much that is worthy of attention by those who know how to use it, but it is not a work to be read by the devout without discrimination (indeed, the author himself says as much), nor is it a reliable guide for beginners in contemplation. Contemplatives who have made some considerable advance in mortification and detachment, and are sufficiently experienced to be able to separate the wheat from the chaff, will find much in it which is of great value when co-ordinated with the teaching of other authorities. We would specially commend the exposition of Passivity in Dialogue III.; of Contemplation of the Sacred Humanity in Dialogue V.; the Three Necessities for Directors in Dialogue VI.; the Seven Marks of Unfitness for Contemplation in Dialogue VII.; and the Teaching on Mortification *passim*; there are also many clear and important definitions and a few really illuminating similes.

Miss Evelyn Underhill is anxious to clear our author of the charge of Quietism, and on most of the points with which she deals she succeeds in doing so, though we cannot entirely agree with her estimate of his teaching. Malaval has no liking for the fundamental Quietist doctrines; nevertheless it must be admitted that he sails perilously near the wind at times. He is clear, for instance, of the doctrine of the Single Act, but, all the same, his teaching on Pure Love is exaggerated; he is also innocent of

Illuminism, but in some places his words may be taken to support that error. The basic criticism which may be made of this book is not so much that it is wrong as that it is, in places, exaggerated and sometimes inconsistent, which, to inexperienced readers, may be almost as bad.

The main drift of our author's teaching may be gathered from the title of his book, the true force of which is masked by the translator's use of the word "simple." All contemplative prayer is simple as opposed to complex, but Malaval did not write *simple* but *facile* which is quite a different thing: contemplation is not "easy."

Our author's tendency is to lead his readers to believe that contemplation is consistently easy and full of sweetness and that the primary activity of the contemplative is the enjoyment of the mystical experience of God: it is true that he does mention aridity, but it is kept very much in the background of the picture, while the tremendous and sometimes terrifying discipline of distractions and desolation which contemplatives know so well finds no place in his scheme. This is an exaggeration which may do grave harm to souls by giving them an altogether mistaken idea of the contemplative life leading to discouragement, if not despair, in protracted trials; moreover here our author parts company with the great teachers of spirituality. St. Teresa, for instance (for whom he expresses "profound veneration"), tells that even after the divine favours had been lavished upon her she experienced at intervals the subtraction of all sensible grace, while in the early part of her life of perfection she speaks of having to do violence to herself to make herself pray and be recollected; yet none of this condition, which is common to contemplative souls, is mentioned in this book, nor does the author seem to have assimilated the teaching of St. John of the Cross on the subject. Baron von Hügel remarks that: "There can be no doubt that mysticism easily lends itself to castle-building, to erections outside of the reality started from, yet which are subsequently taken as so much penetration into this reality. We thus attain to proud would-be triumphal arches, instead of tunnels demanding so much humility and very much labour" (*The Reality of God*, pp. 89-90). There are far more triumphal arches than tunnels in this book!

When we come to consider Malaval's method we find considerable confusion between contemplation and recollection, indeed, according to him, they would seem to be synonymous and acquired contemplation to be nothing more than Brother Lawrence's Practice of the Presence of God; while, once again, we are haunted by that fatal word "easy." But contemplation and recollection are not the same thing, though the one implies

the other, nor is it either easy or possible always to think of God and realize Him present, nor does He intend that we should. In this matter our author definitely joins hands with the Quietists, though he does not proceed to their lengths. Miss Underhill herself quotes Bossuet as saying that they "make perfection consist in something which is impossible in this life—namely, a ceaseless state of contemplation:" and that, though he does not go on to suppress or discourage all other religious exercises, is precisely Malaval's teaching. His real difficulty is a failure to distinguish between an act and a state of prayer.

Further, our author speaks of the soul raising itself to contemplation and achieving contemplation, both dangerous phrases, and he also tells us that "all souls who aspire seriously to perfection, and who wish to die to themselves, can according to the Holy Doctors who have written on this matter, aspire to either ordinary or infused contemplation" (p. 246), which is a bad misrepresentation of the Holy Doctors. It is true that Malaval speaks of the primary leading of God and uses the word "*attrait*" *ad nauseam* and not always in the same sense, nevertheless we are left with the impression that the root of the business is the soul's desire for the enjoyment of God. The teaching of the holy Doctors on this matter is that infused contemplation can neither be achieved nor aspired to; that certain souls in the way of perfection are not called by God to contemplation and so cannot achieve and should not aspire to that state; and that union with God is rather attained by the renunciation of our own will than by seeking to enjoy Him.

We have mentioned grave defects; there is another, which is the difficulty of being sure of the author's meaning on certain points owing to his contradictory statements (in one place he contradicts himself in a single sentence). But, when all has been said that may be, we return to the fact that this book is the work of a truly spiritual and often shrewd man, whose teaching on very many points is lucid, valuable and felicitous. The reader should be prepared to overcome a twentieth-century repugnance to the Dialogue style so dear to seventeenth-century writers.

F. P. HARTON.

NOTICES

THE PASSION OF SS. PERPETUA AND FELICITY MM. A New Edition and Translation of the Latin Text together with the SERMONS OF S. AUGUSTINE upon these Saints now first Translated into English by W. H. Shewring. Sheed and Wård. 3s. 6d.

This is a beautiful edition of one of the most fascinating documents of the early Church, which should appeal alike to the scholar and the general reader. The editor gives us an excellent critical text with sufficient

apparatus criticus and an introduction which ably summarizes the history of the martyrs and the text itself. The translation of the *Passio* is a difficult task which has been carried out in the present case with ability if not distinction; there are, however, a few passages which read like a schoolboy's exercise, the following being the most glaring examples: "(they) obtained with money that" (*constituerunt præmio uti*); "I obtained that" (*usurpavi ut*, p. 25); "I awoke, yet eating I know not what of sweet" (*experrecta sum, commanducans adhuc dulce nescio quid*, p. 26); "a great gulf, so that either might not go to other" (*diastema, ita ut uterque ad invicem accedere non possemus*, p. 29); "with his hand he passed over our faces" (*de manu sua traiecit nobis in faciem*, p. 34); "that our liberty might not be obscured" (*ne libertas nostra obduceretur*, p. 38); "He gave to them asking" (*petentibus dederat*, p. 39); "himself with Revocatus first had ado with a leopard" (*ipse cum Revocato leopardus expertus*, p. 39).

It would have added greatly to the reader's comfort if the Latin and English texts had been printed facing one another; the method adopted of printing them separately being most inconvenient for comparison; we could have wished, too, that the Latin of S. Augustine's Sermons had been printed with the translations. It was a happy thought to include these sermons which make so beautiful a commentary on the *Passio*.

F. P. HARTON.

THE CATHOLIC MOVEMENT AND THE SOCIETY OF THE HOLY CROSS. By J. Embry. The Faith Press. 10s. 6d.

Members of the Society will be glad to have this careful record of its history. Many others, not members and not likely to desire membership, will find here much interesting and valuable matter. The volume is over-long, and not very well constructed. The attempt to give a wider interest to the history of the Society by incorporating what is almost a general narrative of ecclesiastical events from 1855 to 1929 has caused the amount of detail which would have been in place in a domestic record to be a little wearisome. But there is a great deal of useful information, and the book will be of service to historians in time to come.

The story begins in the dark days of the Gorham Judgment and the Papal Aggression; when the proposed revival of Convocation raised a storm of which it is difficult now to understand the bitterness. The object of the Society was "the promotion of holiness of life among the clergy." The author's chief hero is Alexander Heriot Machonachie, who was Master from 1863 to 1876, and again in 1879 to 1881 and 1885. His motto was "No Surrender and no Desertion." He would have no surrender either to imperfectly informed bishops (in 1873 the members of the Lower House of Convocation of Canterbury "all state with the utmost distinctness that they consider the sacramental view of confession a most serious error"), or to a shocked Parliament, or to an abusive Press. At the same time his eager spirit was horrified by desertions, and when in one week and without warning three of Lowder's curates "forsook," in Machonachie's words, "the Church to which under Christ they owed allegiance," he said: "We must cling to the Church of England, our one channel of union with Christ, for good or ill." Side by side with this it is interesting to read that after the publication of the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ*

in 1896 Canon E. G. Wood said that "if there be valid orders anywhere, they are certainly to be found in the English Church. If I had to choose between the Roman Pontifical and the English Ordinal, I should certainly choose the latter as undoubtedly the more satisfactory of the two. . . . It is not we who ought to surcease from the exercise of our orders, it is those who, schismatically ordained in England, have by virtue of the Antiochene Canon no *exercitio ordinis*."

The whole record shows that the Society has always been ready to make a stand for things essential, and sometimes also against things which do not now seem so lamentable as they were then thought to be. Why does Mr. Embry say on p. 371 that the Feast of the Assumption is a Feast of the Universal Church, "older than that of Christmas"?

S. C. CARPENTER.

AGELESS STORIES. By G. D. Rosenthal. Philip Allan. 6s.

THE SCIENCE OF THE SOUL. By Marcus Donovan. Mowbray. 3s. 6d.

Mr. Rosenthal is already well known to Church-people as a preacher who combines a lucidity of exposition with a command of the English language. In his latest volume he has presented several courses of his sermons on the parables in a form suited to a wider public. In his treatment of the parables he confines himself to the practical teaching and psychological truths which they convey, showing that they contain as vital a message to English people today, as ever they did to the Jews who formed their first audience. In his course on the parable of the Prodigal Son, Mr. Rosenthal has shown in a most entertaining fashion how easily the stories of the parables adapt themselves to "modern dress"; and throughout his book he emphasizes his conviction that our Lord's parables contain the key to the solution of the problems of modern life. He preaches the Christianity of commonsense, and is eminently successful in revealing the shortcomings of twentieth-century paganism, and demonstrating the superiority of practical Christianity to rival philosophies of life.

While Mr. Rosenthal writes for the "plain man," Mr. Donovan writes for the more devout. The preface to his book of sermon outlines emphasizes the truth that connected teaching can only be given from the pulpit by the method of "courses." His outlines present a system of devotional instruction, based on the method of St. Ignatius; and they can certainly be used with profit not only by those who preach but by those who meditate. Those who have read Mr. Donovan's former works will not need to be reminded of his gift of apt illustration and his originality in the choice of a text.

The public which buys volumes of sermons probably chiefly consists of the parish clergy. Yet many of the laity today are prevented by a variety of circumstances from hearing any sermons other than brief meditations on the Gospel at Sunday morning service. It is hoped that many of the faithful who "never hear a good sermon" will read the latter of these two books; and that the somewhat less faithful who are in like case will read the former.

H. BEEVOR.

TEXTS AND STUDIES. Vol. IX., No. 3: PELAGIUS'S EXPOSITIONS OF THIRTEEN EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL. Edited by A. Souter, M.A., F.B.A. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

With the publication of this short volume Professor Souter brings his long labours to a close. He tells us in his preface that these Pelagian researches of his were begun as far back as 1904: he has already published an elaborate introduction, and has followed it up since by a volume containing the text of the *Expositions*. There is a touch of humour in the Professor's remark: "The purpose of an all-wise providence, in decreeing that an Augustinian should spend a large portion of his life in studying Pelagius, may be regarded as one of life's ironies." The present and concluding instalment of the *magnum opus* contains the pseudo-Jerome interpolations to the genuine notes of Pelagius. The text is given with critical annotations by the Editor, and, for the purpose of presenting this text as accurately as possible, Professor Souter has made a careful collation of the Götting MS. This exacting bit of work was carried out in 1928.

The book is for specialists only. Nobody but a specialist will find the least interest (we should imagine) in the Interpolator's comments, which are jejune and written in a most unattractive style. Many of them are but glimpses of the obvious. There is one reference to Cicero in these notes, and two or three to the Greek Testament. As far as the vocabulary is concerned, we gather from the Editor's "*Latinitatis breviarium*" that no word appears which has not already been chronicled in Benoist-Goelzer's *Nouveau Dictionnaire*; so lexicographers will look in vain for matters of importance. There are a few characteristics of the Interpolator that distinguish him from Pelagius, and these are duly noted by Professor Souter (pp. ix, x). It was no doubt necessary, in the interests of completeness, that this volume should be added to the Editor's two previous volumes; but we grudge the time spent on the performance. It is hard to think that such a work as a complete edition of Jerome's correspondence is "still to seek." The late Professor J. E. B. Mayor told the present writer that he thought few works of the patristic period were better deserving of attention; and, indeed, who could doubt it, after reading the twenty-second letter (to Eustochium)? Had Professor Souter lavished on Jerome's letters, with their abundant human touches and historical allusions, the immense labour and learning he has bestowed on Pelagius's commentary on the Pauline Epistles, he would have enriched scholarship with a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰ.* *Sed dñs aliter visum*. As it is, Professor Souter has "done the job"—if it was really so essential—once for all. It will not be superseded: it is a masterly performance.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

VOX DILECTI. The Ancient Faith in Modern Terms. By Clement Humilis. Mowbray. 7s. 6d.

This is a wise and tender, and also a very original, book. The author, who calls himself "Clement Humilis," writes from Cambridge; but the reviewer, also writing from Cambridge, is not able to guess at his identity. He seems to be a parish priest and an Anglo-Catholic, and what is rarer than either, a true spiritual director, a man to whom penitents come for guidance and light. *Vox Dilecti* is the outcome of many conversations

between director and penitents. The book is very unusual in form. It is divided into three sections: Counsels on the Spiritual Life, Counsels on National Problems, and Counsels on Doctrine. In each chapter the writer addresses an individual who discussed with him a particular problem. He gives the solution in a few lines of prose, followed by one or two quotations from Scripture or from such works as *The Imitation*, and concludes with some stanzas of *vers libre*.

For instance, "To a Christian who loved party controversy, and thereby injured his growth in holiness," he writes: "Great forces in nature like gravitation and growth are silent. The grace of God is always silent. Man's doings, with their inevitable friction, are manifested in noise and strepitant display. The Christian, therefore, should seek the silent forces of God if he seeks to be strong and real."

Quotations from Kings and Amos (the second in Latin) follow, and then two pages of verse:

"There is no sound of hammer nor of axe
in the temple which God buildeth
in the hearts of men.
Over the sands of time creepeth in silence
the shadows of eternity,
and it needs
that thou shouldst work in silence and in secret
in thy Father's business. . . ."

Advice is given, to all kinds of men and women—"To a beautiful woman whom chronic ill-health debarred from marriage." "To a young literary man of good disposition, who yet found the Psalms, the book of Isaiah and *The Imitation*, both tedious and unsuitable for his present necessities." "To one who overlooked the merits of the Average Man." "To a successful man who thought he had made his own career." "To an eccentric Christian who saw in the League of Nations only an instrument of the devil." "To one who was vexed in spirit when he saw the sins of the Church's rulers manifested in persecutions, unrighteous compromise, worldliness, state-establishment, indifference and positive unbelief; and also the widespread envy, hatred and jealousy, and uncharitable controversy among Christians themselves."

A book to keep and ponder over. The author has written it in the Presence of God, and knows how to see life *sub specie æternitatis*.

AELFRIDA TILLYARD.

A HISTORY OF THE POPES. By Fernand Hayward. J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd. 12s. 6d.

From any point of view of attraction or of repulsion, Rome and the Papacy are outstanding facts of the Christian world. They can be ignored by none who thinks or works therein. It is also true, however, that the detailed history of Papal Rome is not conspicuously well known amongst us, partly no doubt because it has generally been enshrined in great and formidable volumes and has been in consequence difficult of approach. To those who wish to know something of that history and of the varying fortunes of the Papacy, this book of M. Hayward, admirably translated by the Ramsgate Benedictines, should supply a real need. It is clearly and concisely written, and contains a full outline of the history

from the earliest Christian times to the present day in 400 pages. That is, in itself, no small achievement, but the book is no mere dry chronicle or list of names and dates but contrives to give a connected story, enlivened with many sidelights—for example, an account of the abduction of the daughter of Pope Adrian II. (p. 122). The author's standpoint is, naturally, that of the Vatican Council, and therefore when he treats of controverted subjects the Anglican reader will do well to look up what others have said from a different point of view. An instance is the treatment of the Patriarch Photius, looked upon as a saint by the Eastern Orthodox, but here only spoken of as "eaten up with pride" (p. 120), though allowed to be "learned." In a later section we come across "the apostate and schismatic" Döllinger (p. 356). But such statements are merely incidental to a general position and will be properly discounted by the discerning reader; they do not really detract from the value of the book as a whole. Fifteen full-page illustrations, a chronological list of Roman Pontiffs, and a very complete index add to its value. It is altogether a very sound work which can be well recommended.

W. R. V. BRADE.

SYNOPTISCHE STUDIEN. Von W. Bussmann. III. ZU DEN SONDERQUELLEN. Halle (Saale): Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses. M. 14.

The first two parts of this ambitious work were noticed in July, 1930. The concluding part deals with the separate sources of the Synoptic Gospel, other than the primary historical source and the discourses. Mark, the latest of the three Gospels, uses a parallel source for his special matter by the side of the original historical one, as revised by a writer with special Galilæan interests. "Luke" uses the original source in its shortest form, adding to it the source of his special matter and discourses.

It must be concluded with regret that Dr. Bussmann's new contribution is not true. The overwhelming majority of scholars *securus judicat*. One instance must suffice. The story of the rich young man (Mark x. 17-22) is perfectly intelligible on conventional critical lines. To postulate a written source, from which Mark took "ran . . . and kneeled," "do not defraud," "kneeled to him," is unnecessary. The whole theory is built up on the assumption that every deviation in the Synoptic tradition is derived from a written source. The painstaking, ingenious and often convincing analysis of the reasons for Matthew's and Luke's rewriting of Mark, made by a host of scholars, is ignored. The Gospels are treated as rigidly literary documents, instead of being the literary representation of the varying types of preaching.

Dr. Bussmann, however, makes one remark of great interest. "According to the Scriptures," a phrase occurring only in 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4, refers, he says, to the early written accounts of the Passion which were current when St. Paul wrote, and from which he quoted xi. 23-25, the institution of the Eucharist. At first sight this is attractive, especially as no explanation of rising the third day according to the Scriptures *satisfactory to the modern mind* can be found. But Luke xxiv. 25-27, 32, 44-46, is conclusive for the ordinary view.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.